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APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS NORMS IN THE UNITED STATES:
HOLDING MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ACCOUNTABLE IN THE
UNITED STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER THE
ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
CLAUDIA T. SALAZAR
I. INTRODUCTION
Our current international system is composed of both state
actors and a variety of non-state actors. While the classic
definition of international law is the law governing states,1 this
definition has drastically changed in the last century due to the
evolution of the current international system. International law
has adapted to changes within our system in response to the
needs of the global order. Consequently, modern international
law recognizes that non-state actors, including individuals, are
capable of breaching international law. 2 The international
I More than 350 years ago, The Peace of Westphalia led to the establishment of the
classic system of international law. This system centered exclusively on sovereign
states with defined territories which are theoretically equal. States created
international law and were accountable to each other in meeting international legal
obligations.
Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 798, 798 (2002). See Lucy Reed, Great Expectations, Where Does the Proliferation
of International Dispute Resolution Tribunals Leave International Law? 96 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 219, 221 (2002), wherein the author explains that public international law
is traditionally defined as the law governing relations only between states. It is
noteworthy that the crimes of piracy and slave trade were long prohibited under
international law and could be committed by individuals. However, the sovereignty norm
was the dominant theme of international law up until the end of World War II. See Beth
Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 75 (2002), which notes that international law historically
prohibited piracy and slave trading, crimes which private individuals could violate.
2 See generally Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that
private individuals may be held accountable for war crimes and other international
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human rights norms that acknowledge the accountability of non-
state actors for violations of human rights and recognize state
responsibility for protecting human rights of individuals were
established in response to the atrocities of World War II. 3 States
acknowledged their responsibility over the human rights of
individuals and were found to have a duty in promoting and
protecting the human rights of their citizens. 4 Individuals were
also found to be accountable under international law for
violations of human rights.5
Globalization has been a further catalyst in the expansion of
the structure of our current international system.6 Globalization
has facilitated transactions between states and non-state actors;
consequently, allowing such transactions to cross state
boundaries with relative ease. 7 At times, these increased contacts
violations); Ge v. Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (stating in dicta that an
individual need not act under color of state law to be validly prosecuted under the law of
nations); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 2 (introductory note)
(1987) (explaining that individuals may incur liability for breach of international law).
3 See David S. Bloch & Elon Weinstein, Velvet Glove and Iron Fist: A New Paradigm for
the Permanent War Crimes Court, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 18 (1998) (noting
that Nuremburg and subsequent trials addressed the issues of liability by non-state
actors such as "doctors, judges, nongovernmental officials and industrialists"). See
generally William T. D'Zurilla, Individual Responsibility for Torture Under International
Law, 56 TUL. L. REV. 186, 189-91 (1981) (analyzing the individualistic approach to
international law prosecutions); Beth Fain, Comment, The International Criminal Court:
An Eminent Impact on a Hesitant United States, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 163, 171 (2004)
(noting impact of Nuremburg trials on development of human rights).
4 See Reed, supra note 1, at 222 (stating that "[slince the end of World War II, however,
the development of universal human rights law has created a new focus in public
international law, one that concentrates on the conduct of the state directly towards the
individual"); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Thansnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE
L.J. 2347, 2358 (1991) (describing how the evolution of modern transnational public law
litigation in American courts after World War II and in turn pierced "the veil of state
sovereignty"). See generally Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the
Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (1982) (discussing the
historical evolution of the state's protectionist role in human rights).
See Stephens, supra note. 1, at 60 (noting that non-state actors such as corporations
may be liable for human rights violations). See generally Walter W. Heiser, Civil
Litigation as a Means of Compensating Victims of International Terrorism, 3 SAN DIEGO
INT'L L.J. 1, 6-9 (2002) (discussing personal jurisdiction over individual terrorists for
human rights violations); Reed, supra note 1, at 221 (suggesting that private individuals
may be liable for human rights violations such as slavery).
6 See Rudi G. Teitel, Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35
CORNELL IN'L L.J. 355, 357-58 (2002) (noting ramifications of globalization on
international law). See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76
FOREIGN AFF. 183, 183-84 (1997) (stating that "the State is not disappearing, it is
disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts"); Gordon R. Walker & Mark
A. Fox, Globalization: An Analytical Framework, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 375, 375
(1996) (explaining the intersection of globalization and changing policy).
7 See generally Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration:
Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 1014,
1015 (1997) (noting the emergence of a global market); Joel P. Trachtman, The
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between developed and developing nations have created negative
consequences in developing countries.8 Globalization has also
brought forth the dominance of one particular non-state actor
into the system, the modern multinational corporation (MNC). 9
MNCs are in economically powerful positions within the
international system. 10 Currently, fifty-two MNCs compose one
hundred of the largest economies in the world.'1 Wal-Mart, for
example, is worth more than 161 countries in the world. 12 MNCs
International Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 33, 36 (1996) (calling global
economic integration "the leading motivation for new public international law today, and
the most fertile source of new legislation and constitutionalization in international law");
Tracy M. Abels, Comment, The World Trade Organization's First Test: The United States-
Japan Auto Dispute, 44 UCLA L. REV. 467, 469 (1996) (discussing global nature of
transactions).
8 See generally J. Patrick Kelly, Judicial Activism at the World Trade Organization:
Developing Principles of Self-Restraint, 22 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 353, 372 (2002)
(suggesting that developing nations lack the transactional leverage of developed
countries); Surya P. Subedi, The Road From Doha: The Issues For The Development
Round Of The WTO And The Future Of International Trade, 52 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 425,
425 (2003) (noting that some regulation schemes put in place by developed countries do
not protect traditional product output by developing countries). But see D. Robert Webster
& Christopher P. Bussert, The Revised Generalized System of Preferences: "Instant
Replay" or a Real Change?, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 1035, 1036 (1984) (analyzing a
transaction system that specifically benefits developing countries).
9 See Dinah Shelton, Globalization & the Erosion of Sovereignty in Honor of Professor
Lichtenstein: Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C.INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 273, 273 (2002) (discussing the increasing power of MNCs). See generally Allan E.
Gotlieb, Extraterritoriality: A Canadian Perspective, 5 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 449, 451
(1983) (stating "to a considerable extent, the multinational corporation has been the
engine of international economic activity, the economic actor whose activities so regularly
cross national boundaries that it often blurs those very boundaries"); Stephens, supra
note 1, at 56 (noting the modern multinational corporation arose after World War II).
10 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 273 wherein the author states that "components of what
has come to be known as globalization---have led to the emergence of powerful non state
actors who have resources sometimes greater than those of many states." See Douglass
Cassel, International Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Can International Law Truly
Effect Global, Political, and Economic Stability? Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human
Rights Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1963, 1963 (1996) for the point that the end of
the Cold War has possibly brought forth "a second human rights revolution" involving
expanded responsibility in MNCs to protect human rights and the opinion that MNCs are
"more powerful than most national governments." Additionally, it has been argued that
multinational enterprises are the most powerful phenomena arising from capitalism. See
Kojo Yelpaala, In Search of Effective Policies for Foreign Direct Investment: Alternatives to
Tax Incentive Policies, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 208, 224 (1985).
11 See discussion infra Part IV (detailing existence of MNCs in global economy); see also
Exxon is Bigger than Pakistan, JOURNAL (Newcastle, UK), Apr. 14, 2002, at 25 (reporting
that the Exxon corporation is worth more than the entire national economy of Pakistan);
Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200. The Rise of Global Corporate Watch,
CORPORATE WATCH 2000 (noting that MNCs outnumber countries in the top 100 largest
economies in the world), available at http:llwww.globalpolicy.org/soceconltncs/top200.htm.
(last visited Apr. 17, 2004).
12 See id. (stating that Wal-Mart is worth more than 161 countries in the world); see also
Michael Olesker, $1.9 million Mcdonald not in touch with reality, SUN (Baltimore),
August 10, 1997, at 1B (reporting that Wal-Mart's sales "are bigger than 161 countries,
including Israel, Poland and Greece"). See generally Nicholas Thompson, Netflix Uses
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have become important actors in the international system
because of their economic dominance, particularly in their
relations with developing countries. 13  Their economically
dominant position gives them a bargaining chip in their
interactions with developing countries because of the potential
wealth they can bring to such countries.1 4 Foreign direct
investment enables MNCs to contract with developing countries
for use of resources, cheap labor, land, and military protection
over MNC projects. 15  Unfortunately, these relations have
involved contracting with countries that are known for their
disregard for human rights and have consequently led to issues
within international human rights law.16 For example, there
have been incidences of the use of child labor and worker's rights
Speed to Fend Off Wal-Mart Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2003, at C1 (mentioning
that Wal-Mart has sales of about $244 billion per year).
13 See Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and
International Law: Where From Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (2003) (noting that the
most frequent victims of human rights violations by MNCs are developing countries); Eric
Engle, Corporate Social Responsibility: Market-Based Remedies For International Human
Rights Violations?, 40 WILLAMEITE L. REV. 103, 109 (2004) (discussing corporations using
labor from third-world countries); see also John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human
Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463, 463 (2000)
(establishing that world trade powers are calling for implementation of codes of conduct
for MNCs to curb abuses in developing countries).
14 See Barnaby J. Feder, Talking Business, From Tobacco to Insurance, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 1984, at 2 (calling MNCs "wealth generators" in the context of both developed
and developing countries); see also Louis Uchitelle, International Business; Globalization
Marches On, as U.S. Eases Up on the Reins, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001, at C12 (noting
that MNCs more effectively produce wealth when properly regulated). But see William J.
Broad, Gas Leak is Expected to Reduce Investment in the Third World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 1984, at A8 (explaining that certain events incite developing countries to reject MNC
advances).
15 See El Hadji Guisse, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The
Question of Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN4/Sub.2/1998/6 (1998) (stating "[tioday's economic and financial systems are
organized in such a way as to act as pumps that suck out the output of the labour of the
toiling masses and transfer it, in the form of wealth and power, to a privileged minority");
see also Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon. An
Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational
Corporations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 91 (2002) (noting MNCs involvement in
extractions industries has led them to contract with developing countries). See generally
Paul Lewis, Multinationals Raised '95 Investment in 3d World 13%, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
1996, at D5 (saying that foreign direct investment in developing countries has more than
tripled since 1991 and is expected to continue increasing).
16 See Paul Redmond, Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for
Standard Setting and Compliance, 69 INT'L LAw. 102, 178 (2003) (explaining how
globalization is "antithetical to the systemic goals of human rights protection"). See
generally Anderson, supra note 13, at 468 (arguing that corporations have no right to
profit from human rights violations); Kelly, supra note 8, at 355 (suggesting that some
developing countries view strict human rights regulations over MNC involvement as an
impediment to wealth acquisition).
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abuses by MNCs in developing countries.1 7 Additionally, foreign
military, known to have had a history of violating human rights,
have committed human rights violations while in working for
MNCs.18 MNCs argue they are not responsible nor should be
found liable for such atrocities because they did not directly
commit the violations nor ordered such violations to occur. 19
Arguably, developing host countries have not sought claims
against MNCs for human rights abuses for fear of losing foreign
direct investment.20  Unfortunately, international legal
procedures whereby MNCs are held directly accountable for
human rights violations are non-existent.
21
' See Madeleine Grey Bullard, Child Labor Prohibitions Are Universal, Binding,
Obligatory Law: The Evolving State of Customary International Law Concerning the
Unempowered Child Laborer, 24 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 139, 177 (2001) (discussing a series of
lawsuits brought against numerous corporations for violations of workers rights). See
generally Bruce Bigelow, 8 U.S. Clothing Firms to Settle Suit Alleging Sweatshops on
Saipan, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Mar. 29, 2000, at C2; Nancy Cleeland, 4 U.S. Retailers
Settle Saipan Labor Suit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1999, at C2 (reporting settlement details of
workers' rights violation case).
18 See, e.g., Stephens supra note 1, at 52 (discussing British Petroleum's contracting
with Colombian military forces who committed human rights abuses); see also Bloomberg
News, Court Tells Unocal to Face Rights Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at C13
(exploring Unocal's liability for human rights abuses by the Myanmar military that the
corporation had hired as security); Shell Game in Nigeria, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1995, at 4-
14 (editorializing on the role of Shell in the execution of those who opposed their corporate
expansion in India).
19 See Brad J. Kieserman, Comment, Profits and Principles: Promoting Multinational
Corporate Responsibility by Amending the Alien Torts Claim Act, 48 CATH. U.L. REV. 881,
882 (1999) (stating MNCs argue "they are not responsible for the abusive conduct of their
foreign host governments"); see also Andy Rowell, Shell Shocked: Did the Shell Petroleum
Company Silence Nigerian Environmentalist Ken Saro-Wiwa?, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 21,
1995, at 20 (reporting Shell's claims that it could not get involved in the affairs of a
sovereign state and refused to exercise its influence over the Nigerian military junta to
prevent the execution of activist Ken Saro-Wiwa). See generally Paul Lewis, Rights
Groups Say Shell Oil Shares Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, at 1-6 (discussing
backlash against Shell by human rights groups who believed Shell either affirmatively
encouraged Saro-Wiwa's execution or could have done more to prevent it).
20 See Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It-And Why the United States Shouldn't: The
United States' International Obligation to Hold MNCs Accountable for Their Labor Rights
Violations Abroad, 11 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 395, 422 (1999) (recognizing economic constraints
that hold developing countries back from enforcing labor laws to protect labor rights of
citizens); see also Maria Ellinikos, American MNCs Continue to Profit from the Use of
Forced and Slave Labor Begging the Question: Should America Take a Cue from
Germany? 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 26 (2001) (blaming the risk host countries face
of losing MNCs business for their failure in preventing MNC behavior). See generally
Kieserman, supra note 19, at 910-11 (describing symbiotic relationship between host
governments and MNCs).
21 See Mark B. Baker, Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the
American Multinational Corporation, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 89, 141 (2001) (writing that
MNCs "sail on the seas of commerce virtually untrammeled"); see also Terry
Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanisms,
15 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 184 (bemoaning lack of "any real enforcement power" at the
International Labor Organization and the United Nations). See generally Douglas M.
Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1211 (2002)
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As previously stated, the accountability of non-state actors for
human rights violations is an international human rights norm.22
International law is recognized by states through the
internalization of these international norms, 23  such as
application through domestic legislation.24 The United States has
internalized the norm of holding non-state actors accountable for
violations of international law through the enforcement of the
two hundred year old statute, the Alien Torts Claim Act
(ATCA).25 In the last two decades, U.S. federal courts have heard
numerous suits brought forth under the ATCA claiming human
rights violations abroad.26 The rise in this litigation has been
attributed to the Second Circuit's landmark holding in Filartiga
v. Irala-Pena.27 There, the ATCA was interpreted as granting
(arguing for increased role of international organizations in handling problems with
MNCs).
22 See Koh, supra note 4, at 2358-59 (emphasizing that international law norms have
application beyond states); see also Reed, supra note 1, at 223 (recognizing development of
international norms to hold private actors responsible for human rights violations). See
generally Fain, supra note 3, at 171 (noting role of customary international law in
establishment of human rights on international stage).
. 23 See Robert 0. Keohane, When Does International Law Come Home?, 35 HOUS. L. REV.
699, 699 (1998) (describing process of state conformity to international law); see also Janet
Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or
Promise?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 282-83 (1999) (recognizing potential link
between internationalization and compliance); Scott M. Sullivan, Changing the Premise of
International Legal Remedies: The Unfounded Adoption of Assurances and Guarantees of
Non-Repetition, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 265, 297 (2003) (ascribing import to
internalization of international norms in process of ensuring state compliance).
24 See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555, 1556 (1984) (noting that a "state ordinarily finds it necessary or convenient to
incorporate international law into its municipal law to be applied by its courts"); see also
Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1830-31 (2003)
(describing treaty ratification as one process through which states internalize
international norms); Levit, supra note 23, at 281 (reporting Argentina's incorporation of
international norms through its constitution).
25 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). The Alien Torts Claim Act is also known as the Alien Tort
Statute. See, e.g., Hon. John. M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication of International
Human Rights Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 539, 539
(1997); Eric Gruzen, Comment, The United States as a Forum for Human Rights
Litigation: Is This the Best Solution, 14 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 207, 209.
26 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 457, 457 (2001) (noting that "[i]nternational human rights litigation in US courts
largely began in 1980 with the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala'); see
also William J. Aceves, Relative Normativity: Challenging the Sovereignty Norm Through
Human Rights Litigation, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 261, 274 (2002) (observing
increase in human rights lawsuits under the ATCA after Filartiga); Beth Stephens,
Taking Pride in International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 485, 485 (2001)
(reporting ATCA human rights suits brought forth in federal courts over the past twenty
years).
27 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding Paraguayan police
officer liable for violating the law of nations for committing torture upon Paraguayan
citizen while acting under color of law); see Bradley, supra note 26, at 457 (signaling
Filartiga decision as corresponding with rise of "human rights litigation in US courts");
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plaintiffs a cause of action and federal courts jurisdiction over
cases arising under violations of the law of nations.28 Since
Filartiga, U.S. federal courts have expanded the ATCA's
jurisdiction to encompass a broad range of categories of violations
of international law. 29 Additionally, the category of defendants
liable under ATCA has evolved to include state officers, 30
individuals, 31 and most recently MNCs. 32 This Note argues that
use of the ATCA is consistent with modern international law
because it internalizes an accepted norm, which is subject to
universal jurisdiction. Use of the ATCA against MNCs is further
justified in light of their status within the global order making
them the equivalent of states.
The evolution of the ATCA litigation is consistent with the
expansion of the structure of the international system and the
evolution of international law.33 Accordingly, the application of
see also Aceves, supra note 26, at 274 (attributing increase in human rights cases filed in
U.S. to the Filartiga decision).
28 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d. at 888 (holding that "it sufficient here to construe the Alien
Tort Statute, not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal
courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international law"); Bradley,
supra note 26, at 458 (reporting holding of Filartiga); see also Aceves, supra note 26, at
273 (noting court's decision in Filartiga).
29 See Aceves, supra note 26, at 274 (listing "numerous violations of international law"
that now fall under ATCA); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-43 (2d. Cir. 1995)
(extending protections of ATCA to rape, genocide, and torture); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp. 162, 189 (D.Mass. 1995) (extending protections of ATCA summary execution and
arbitrary detention).
30 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889 (applying ATCA to Paraguayan police officer); Aceves,
supra note 26, at 274 (including "government officials" in list of possible defendants under
the ACTA); see also In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978
F.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying ATCA to former president of Philippines).
31 See Aceves, supra note 26, at 274 (listing "private individuals" as possible defendants
under ATCA); see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 236 (holding self-proclaimed president of non-
identified state of "Srpska" could be liable under ATCA). See generally David Stoelting,
Status Report on the International Criminal Court, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 233, 250
(1999) (noting application of international law to individuals not associated with
"recognized nations").
32 See Aceves, supra note 26, at 274 (listing "multinational corporations" among possible
defendants under ATCA); see also Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628,
00-57195, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th. Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), at *3 (finding Unocal,
an American MNC, liable for "aiding and abetting' human rights violations committed by
Myanmar military officers), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
2716 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244
F. Supp. 2d 289, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding corporate defendant liable under ATCA).
33 See generally H. Knox Thames,, Forced Labor and Private Individual Liability in U.S.
Courts, 9 MSU-DCL J. INT'L L. 153, 153 (2000) (looking to international standards to
determine whether there should be ACTA liability); John F. Carella, Comment, Of
Foreign Planitiffs and Proper Fora: Forum Non Conveniens and ATCA Class Actions,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 717, 722 (2003) (tying together expansion of ATCA to private actors
to "modern law of nations"); Justin Lu, Note, Jurisdiction over Non-State Activity under
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 531, 543 (1997) (noting
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the ATCA upon MNCs is consistent with their present role in our
current international system and accepted international human
rights norms. Self regulation among MNCs is not necessarily the
best answer. For example, some MNCs have implemented their
own corporate codes of conduct in response to claims against
them for allowing such violations to occur. 34 However, such codes
have not proven effective in ending human rights abuses because
they are often vague or lack enforcement mechanisms. 35
This Note sets forth an explanation of how the ATCA is applied
to MNCs and why it is justified in the enforcement of
international human rights norms. Part II will delineate a brief
history of the origins and use of the ATCA prior to Filartiga.
Part II will also discuss the international legal setting following
World War II prior to Filartiga. Part III will analyze Filartiga
and then outline the development of the ATCA's application by
federal courts. A discussion of the evolution of categories of
defendants for violations of international law will follow,
culminating in the latest application of the ATCA upon MNCs.
Part IV will summarize possible applications upon MNCs in light
of current ATCA interpretation. Part V will conclude the current
interpretation by federal courts of the ATCA is applicable.
Lastly, it will explain the justification of the ATCA's application
upon MNCs for human rights violations.
justification of private actor liability under the ATCA has been developing international
norms along the same lines)..
3 See Ayoub, supra note 20, at 403 (noting development of "codes of conduct"); see also
Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Promoting International Respect for Workers Rights Through
Business Codes of Conduct, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (mentioning use of voluntary
"codes of conduct" in U.S. corporations); Nike Code of Conduct, at http://www.nike.coml
nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=25&cat=compliance&sub cat=code (last updated Jan. 2004)
(giving Nike's standards that are meant to guide facility decisions).
35 See Ayoub, supra note 20, at 403-04 (noting lack of impact of some corporate codes of
conduct); see also Stephen G. Wood & Brett G. Scharfs, Applicability of Human Rights
Standards to Private Corporations: An American Perspective, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 556-
57 (2002) (explicating various problems with corporate codes of conduct). But see Mark B.
Baker, Private Codes of Corporate Conduct: Should the Fox Guard the Henhouse?, 24 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 399, 400 (arguing that MNCs should be self-regulated).
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II. EARLY HISTORY OF THE ATCA: PRE-FILARTIGA
A. Enactment and Application
The ATCA was originally enacted during the first session of
the U.S. Congress in 1789.36 Minimal legislative history exists to
aid in identifying Congress' original intent in enacting the
statute. 37 The ATCA specifically grants district courts "original
jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."38  Professor Ann-Marie Slaughter 39  posits
Congress purposely chose the exact words of the statute to
further our nation's self-interest; to protect our nation from other
nations' retaliation for not abiding by international law. 40
Secondly, Congress wanted to promote trade within our country
by enabling foreign merchants to have the opportunity to bring
civil claims in our courts.41 Lastly, the United States would have
been viewed as a legitimate player within the international
36 See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 A.J.I.L 461, 461 (1989) (noting date of original enactment); see also
Peter Schuyler Black, Recent Development, Kadic v. Karadzic: Misinterpreting the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 31 GA. L. REV. 281, 281 (1996) (reporting ATCA inclusion in Judiciary
Act of 1789); Matthew R. Skolnik, Comment, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine in
Alien Tort Claims Act Cases: A Shell of Its Former Self after WIWA, 16 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 187, 187 (citing date of enactment of the ATCA).
37 See id. at 196 n.53 (citing to the statute); see also Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
226 F.3d 88, 104 n.10 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that the ATCA "has no formal legislative
history"); Joshua Ratner,, Back to the Future: Why a Return to the Approach of the
Filartiga Court is Essential to Preserve the Legitimacy and Potential of the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 83, 121 (2002) (recognizing "paucity of
legislative history" for the ATCA).
38 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
3 Professor Slaughter is formerly known as Ann-Marie Burley and was the author of
The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789, an extensive study of the ATCA.
4o See Burley, supra note 36, at 481 (detailing the interests that foreign governments
and individuals had in seeing justice, or compensation, dealt out fairly); see also Anthony
D'Amato, Comment, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82
A.J.I.L 62, 64-65 (1988) (explaining that the ATCA :was an important national security
interest in 1789). See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 500-01 (Alexander Hamilton)
(stating the standard support the ATCA).
41 See Burley, supra note 36, at 482 (stating that the ATCA sent a message to foreigners
that they could conduct "business as usual"); see also Jamison G. White, Note, Nowhere To
Run, Nowhere To Hide: Augusto Pinochet, Universal Jurisdiction, The ICC, And A Wake-
Up Call For Former Heads Of State, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 127, 141 (1999) (comparing
the ATCA with the TVPA, AEDPA, and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). See
generally 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 881 (G. Chase 4th
ed. 1923) (detailing the importance of criminalizing the violation of safe passage for
foreign merchants).
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system in 1789 with the enactment of the ATCA by
acknowledging the rule of international law.42
After the ATCA was enacted, it was seldom cited or used and
jurisdiction under the ATCA was only upheld twice prior to
Filartiga.43 The first was the 1795 case of Bolchos v. Darrell.44
There, the court found jurisdiction existed under the ATCA
because a treaty existed that dealt with the property rights of
slaves seized as prizes of war - the main issue in the case. 45 The
next case to find jurisdiction under the ATCA did not arise until
1961. In Adra v.Clift,46 the plaintiff claimed his former wife and
her new husband violated international law when they concealed
the name and identity of his daughter on an Iraqi passport
attempting to evade handing her over to the plaintiff.47 This
clearly fell under the definition of a tort as required under the
ATCA. 48 Both cases were therefore relatively simple applications
under the ATCA. One involved looking to a treaty while the
other involved a tort which had occurred within the United
States.49
The historical events of the 1940s and 1950s led to substantial
changes within the structure of the international system and
framework of international law. 50 By its nature, international
42 See Burley, supra note 36, at 482 (stating that the founders sought to uphold the "law
of nations as a moral imperative."); Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87
A.J.I.L 529, 529 (1993) (stating that international law must be accepted as having the
authority to legislate universal norms). See generally Jianming Shen, The Basics of
International Law: Why Countries Observe, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 287, 291 (1999) (describing
the natural law foundations for international law).
43 See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims:
Inquiries into the Alien Torts Claims Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 4-5 (1985)
(noting that twenty-one cases claimed ATCA jurisdiction prior to Filartiga); see also Beth
Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of
Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 7
(2002) (stating the ATCA was "relied upon in only two cases"). See generally Bolchos v.
Darrell, 3 F.Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (upholding jurisdiction under the ATCA).
44 Id. (stating that because original case arose at sea admiralty law applied though
seizure occurred on land).
45 Id. at 810 (stating treaty with France alters the "law of nations" and states that
property of friends found on ships of enemies must be forfeited).
46 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961)(denying father's request for the return of his
daughter, and dismissed counterclaim for child support in custody action).
47 Id. at 863 (stating under Lebanese law, the father is entitled to the custody of his
daughter).
48 Id. at 862 (stating facts of case).
49 See Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F.Cas. 810, 811 (D.S.C. 1795) (mentioning treaty with
France); see also Adra, 195 F. Supp. at 861 (noting various facts of case which occurred in
the United States); Stephens, supra note 43, at 7 (examining both cases in turn).
50 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 281 (noting change in international law due to Nazi
acts); see also Elisabeth Zoller, The "Corporate Will" of the United Nations and the Rights
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law is not static; it adapts over time based on interactions
between states and their responses in internalizing and
externalizing norms.51 International law is also affected by
developments within international society.52  Hence, it is
important to assess the historical setting prior to Filartiga which
influenced modern interpretation of the ATCA.
B. International Law after World War 11
1. The Recognition of Non-State Actor's Liability Under
International Law
The atrocities of World War II led to the development of
international human rights law. 53 Human rights law developed
to apply to both individuals and states. 54 International human
rights law further recognized that states owe a duty to their
citizens.55
of the Minority, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 610, 626 (1987) (noting fundamental changes in the
United Nations including the adoption of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution); Rajesh
Swaminathan, Note, Regulating Development: Structural Adjustment and the Case for
National Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 161,
163-69 (1998) (examining the International Monetary Fund and World Bank).
51 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 281 (noting changes in international after World War
II); see also John Alan Cohen, The Bush Doctrine and the Emerging Norm of Anticipatory
Self-Defense in Customary International Law, 15 PACE INT'L L. REV. 283, 299-300 (2003)
(detailing changes in international law after the World Trade Center attacks). See
generally Oleg Tiunov, Concepts and Features of International Law: Its Relation To Norms
of the National Law of the State, 38 ST. LOUIS L. J. 915, 916 (1994) (speaking generally of
how international law changes over time).
52 See Cohen, supra note 51, at 298-99 (noting changes after 9/11 on international law
and customs); see also Shelton, supra note 9, at 281 (detailing changes after the Nazi
atrocities). See generally Tiunov, supra note 51, at 916 (noting changes to international
law after international events).
53 See MICHEAL FREEMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS 33 (Polity Press ed., Blackwell Publishers
Inc. 2002) (stating "the immediate cause of the human rights revival, however, was the
growing knowledge of Nazi atrocities in the Second World War"); see also Shelton, supra
note 9, at 281 (noting human rights law the international community response to the
atrocities of WWII). See generally Koh, supra note 4, at 2358-59 (stating end of WWII
"dispelled the myth that international law is for states only, re-declaring that individuals
are subjects, not objects, of international law").
54 See id. at 2359 (stating "[tihereafter, private citizens, government officials,
nongovernmental organizations and multinational enterprises could all be rights holders
and responsible actors under international law..."); see also Stephens, supra note 1, at 89
(noting her conclusion that "that core human rights norms apply to corporations as well
as to states and individuals"). See generally Aceves, supra note 26, at 262 (arguing that
state sovereignty may conflict and lose against jus cogens norms, such as the right to life
and prohibition against genocide).
55 See Stephen R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 455 (2001) (describing the evolution of international
law after WWII acknowledge state responsibility in the area of human rights); see also
Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights
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Human rights developed when states cooperated to implement
numerous international organizations, such as the United
Nations (UN),56 to ensure that human rights were respected.57
The UN Charter establishes human rights as the objective of the
organization by listing its third purpose under Article 1.58 The
standard for human rights is also exemplified in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ('UDHR') adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly of on December 10, 1948.59 The
UDHR codified the view that all people are entitled to human
rights.60 The text specifically refers to the respect and promotion
of human rights by "every individual, and every organ of
society."61 It concludes stating that "nothing in this Declaration
may be interpreted as implying for any state, group or person
any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at
the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth
Law, 97 AM. J. IN'L L. 38, 49 n.65 (2003) (arguing that "the affirmative responsibilities of
states with respect to the realization of human rights should not be limited to their own
citizens or territorial jurisdiction, but should extend to a duty of solidarity and
cooperation with other states for the creation and maintenance of an international order
in which human rights are realized"). See generally Surya P. Subedi, Are the Principles of
Human Rights "Western" Ideas? An Analysis of the Claim of the "Asian" Concept of
Human Rights from the Perspectives of Hinduism, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 45, 68 (1999)
(stating that "it is the duty of the State to promote and protect the rights of its citizens").
56 The victorious Allies signed the United Nations into effect on October 24, 1945. See,
e.g., Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 DAYTON
L. REV. 565, 571 n.17 (1996). A brief historical account of the development of the United
Nations can be obtained at http://www.un.org/Overviewlbriefl.html. (last visited April 17,
2004). The UN came into existence on October 24, 1945 in San Francisco "[t]o maintain
peace and security." See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
57 See id. (noting the end of WWII led to a legal order based on institutions); see also
Luke T. Lee, The Right to Compensation: Refugees and Countries of Asylum, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 532, 541 (1986) (stating "all members of the United Nations all legally bound to
observe and respect human rights"). See generally Cox, supra note 56, at 571 n.17
(quoting the United Nations charter).
58 See U.N. CHARTER art. 30; see also Cox, supra note 56, at 571 n.17 (quoting the
United Nations charter). See generally Lee, supra note 57, at 541-42 (calling attention to
the Charter itself).
59 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 III (A) (1948) [hereinafter
'"Universal Declaration"] (creating uniform human rights standards); see also HENRY J.
STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 150-51 (Oxford
University Press 2000) (noting the significance of the Universal Declaration). See
generally Mary Ann Glendon, Rights from Wrongs, ch. 9 (forthcoming 2004 manuscript)
(detailing the increased protections afforded by the Universal Declaration).
60 See Universal Declaration, supra note 59, at III(A) (emphasizing the broad
applicability of the Universal Declaration); see also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 59, at
150-51 (detailing the "universal" aspects of the Universal Declaration). See generally
Glendon, supra note 59, at ch. 9 (indicating the broad sweep of the Universal
Declaration).
61 See Universal Declaration, supra note 59, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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herein."62  Components of the UDHR are now viewed as
customary international law by many nations.63
Human rights law was applied to individuals after World War
II through "transnational public law litigation."64 Transnational
public law litigation occurred through the enforcement of human
rights norms in the international arena in the Nuremberg war
crime tribunals.65 There, German soldiers were held accountable
for participating in acts of genocide on behalf of Germany. 66 Their
claims of acting under government orders were unjustified in
light of the egregious violations they had committed upon the
Jewish populations. 67
The aftermath of the war incorporated non-state actors into
the international legal system. 68 It led to the recognition of
individual and state accountability for violations of human
62 Id. at art. 30.
63 See Harold Hongju Koh, Different But Equal: The Human Rights of Persons with
Intellectual Disabilities, 63 MD. L. REV. 1, 5 (2004) (discussing universal acceptance of
UDHR); see also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 59, at 142-43 (indicating the conjunction
between customary international law and the Universal Declaration). See generally H.
LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 61 (Praeger 1950) (noting the
general acceptance of the Universal Declaration).
64 See Koh, supra note 4, at 2348-49 (defining transnational public law litigation as
involving suits brought by individuals, government officers, and nation states, who in
turn sue one another or are sued in domestic courts or other judicial fora and in these
suits, the parties involved bring claims under both domestic and international law,
otherwise called "transnational" law); see also Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law:
Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1982)
(indicating the application of transnational public law litigation after World War ID). See
generally STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 59, at 142-45 (detailing the advancement of
human rights law through transnational public law litigation).
65 See Koh, supra note 4, at 2358-2361 (describing the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crime
tribunals as "pierc[ing] the veil of state sovereignty and dispell[ing] the myth that
international law is for states only, re-declaring that individuals are subjects not just
objects, of international law"); see also Aceves, supra note 26, at 266 (citing the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal to exemplify the normative development of
"individual responsibility for human rights abuses"). See generally STEINER & ALSTON,
supra note 59, at 115-21 (noting the role of transnational public law litigation in war
crimes tribunals).
66 See Koh, supra note 4, at 3258 (discussing Allied powers view of international law
after WWII); see also Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values, and Functions,
216 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE LAW ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL DROIT 208
(Vol. IV, 1989) (indicating the accountability of German soldiers). See generally STEINER &
ALSTON, supra note 59, at 115-21 (noting the then contemporary view of war crimes).
67 See Koh, supra note 4, at 3258 (noting the unsuccessful defense of acting under
orders); see also Henkin, supra note 66, at 208 (indicating the liability of German
soldiers). See generally STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 59, at 115-21(noting the failure of
any defense related to acting under orders).
68 See Sohn, supra note 64, at 6 (noting the post-war involvement of non-state actors);
see also Henkin, supra note 66, at 208 (detailing the post-war human rights landscape).
See generally STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 59, at 115-21 (surveying the role of non-
state actors after World War II).
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rights.69 States were required to respect their citizens' human
rights under international human rights law.70 Human rights
were also to be respected by non-state actors.7' Consequently,
these events defined the human rights norms in place today.
2. Globalization and MNCs in Our International System
Globalization existed intermittently over centuries 72  but
expanded at a more rapid pace at the end of World War II7 The
proliferation of globalization was in part due to increased
cooperation between nations to recoup from the war. 74 The Allied
nations came together in an attempt to ease the economic
devastation by creating the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, now known as the World Trade Organization.7 5 These
international organizations were implemented to liberalize trade
across state boundaries.7 6 An open market was expected as
69 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 282 (detailing individual responsibility for human rights
violations); see also Sohn, supra note 64, at 10-11 (noting the dual accountability of both
states and individuals). See generally Henkin, supra note 66, at 208 (indicating the
application of human rights norms to individuals).
70 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 282 (indicating the state's responsibility); see also Sohn,
supra note 64, at 10-11 (detailing the role of states in protecting human rights). See
generally Henkin, supra note 66, at 208 (noting the new functions of states within the
human rights context).
71 See THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 60
(Oxford University Press 1986) (detailing the accountability of non-state actors); see also
STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 59, at 211-14 (noting the responsibility of non-state
actors). See generally Shelton, supra note 9, at 322 n.8 (describing the roles and
responsibilities of non-state actors).
72 See id. (noting that some have noted globalization may gave existed prior to the 15th
century); see also MERON, supra note 71, at 60 (detailing the historical trends in
globalization). See generally STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 59, at 211-14 (indicating the
historical development of globalization).
73 See Shelton, supra note, at 322 n.8 (explaining the emphasis on international human
rights law began with the entrance of globalization as a result of the greater trade
between nations at the end of the 19th century and the ramifications of industrialization
upon working conditions); see also MERON, supra note 71, at 60 (detailing the rapid post-
war globalization). See generally STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 58, at 1351-53
(indicating the increased trend towards globalization following World War II).
74 See Freeman, supra note 53, at 160 (noting the increased inter-cooperation among
nations following World War II); see also Shelton, supra note 9, at 287 (detailing the post-
war interdependent nature of globalization). See generally STEINER & ALSTON, supra note
59, at 1351-53 (noting the development of post-war globalization).
75 See Freeman, supra note 53, at 160 (discussing the creation of the Bretton Woods
institutions); see also Shelton, supra note 9, at 287 (detailing the development of post-war
non-state actors). See generally STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 59, at 1308-09 (noting
that the World Trade Organization resulted at the end of the Uruguay Round
agreements).
76 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 284 (detailing the development of the World Trade
Organization); see also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 59, at 1334-42 (indicating the
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resulting in greater economic wealth to all in the international
system. 77
The MNC is not a new phenomenon. The predecessor to the
modern MNC dates back to the 1 5 th century.78 The modern MNC
grew in numbers after the establishment of lenient trade
regulations at the end of World War 11. 79 In response to the
imposition of an open global market, MNCs extended their
initiatives into developing countries where abundant resources
and cheap labor existed.80 This expansion into developing
countries resulted in substantial profits and growth.81 As a
result, MNCs accumulated considerable economic power.8 2 The
human rights function of the World Trade Organization). See generally World Trade
Organization, at http://www.wto.org (discussing the purposes of the organization) (last
visited April 17, 2004).
77 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 284 (discussing the objective of economic globalization as
"improv[ing] economic well being through efficient market exchanges"); see also The
World Bank Group, at www.worldbank.org (stating mission as fighting poverty and
improving living standards for those in developing world) (last visited April 17, 2004); The
International Monetary Fund, at http://www.internationalmonetaryfund.org/external/
about.htm (stating organization was founded to promote international monetary
cooperation, foster economic growth, and high levels of employment) (last visited April 13,
2004).
78 See Stephens, supra note 1, at 45 (discussing history of transnational corporations
and noting first business corporations existed in Britain in the 15th century and American
transnational corporation dates back to late 1800s); see also Elisa Westfield,
Note, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprise Responsibility: Corporate
Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1075, 1076 (2002) (discussing
increasing separation of globalizing economy and globalizing labor and employment). See
generally Deva, supra note 13, at 1-2 (discussing various international mechanisms for
regulating MNE human rights concerns).
79 See Stephen G. Wood & Brett G. Scharffs, American Law in a Time of Global
Interdependence: U.S. National Reports to the XVIth International Congress of
Comparative Law: Section IV: Applicability of Human Rights Standards to Private
Corporations: An American Perspective, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 538 (2002) (arguing a
"fundamental change" occurred after WWII when international trade increased "resulting
in the emergence of a new private corporation, the transnational corporation ('TNC') or
the multinational enterprise ('MNE')"); see also Stephens, supra note 1, at 56 (explaining
that the modern MNC rapidly expanded after WWII because it transgressed international
borders to produced and exchange goods and services). See generally Deva, supra note 13,
at 6 (discussing criteria of what constitutes a MNC).
80 See Ayoub, supra note 20, at 401 (discussing MNCs expansive role in lesser developed
countries in the 1970s); see also Deva, supra note 13, at 8 (discussing human rights
violations that MNC's have been accused of violating). See generally Westfield, supra note
78, at 1077 (noting focus in last two decades on MNC's rather then host countries in
addressing human rights violations).
81 See Ayoub, supra note 20, at 401 (stating higher profits resulted from paying workers
very little while keeping prices high); see also Paul Redmond, International Company and
Securities Law: Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for Standard
Setting and Compliance, 37 INT'L LAW. 69, 75 n.33 (2003) (discussing possibility of SEC
requiring disclosure of social and environmental conditions of over seas operations). See
generally Stephens, supra note 1, at 52 (discussing profits of MNC's).
82 See Wood & Scharffs, supra note 79, at 539 (noting the gross sales of several MNCs
was much more than GDPs of countries); see also Stephens, supra note 1, at 52 (listing
examples of MNCs that are financially worth more than states). See generally Ayoub,
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total number of MNCs is now near 35,000 in the world.8 3 Thus,
MNCs established themselves as dominant actors in
international society.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ATCA
The Second Circuit's landmark interpretation of the ATCA in
FilartigaM4 in 1980 is viewed by many as opening the doors to
ATCA litigation.8 5 Since Filartiga, the majority of suits under the
ATCA have primarily involved allegations of violations of
international human rights.8 6 ATCA litigation has evolved
considerably over the last twenty years. Its application has
expanded upon the class of defendants and by broadening
interpretations of the definition of violations of the law of
nations.8 7
This Note argues the development of the ATCA is consistent
with the historical context after 1980. The end of the Cold War
brought forth further globalization and increased trade between
MNCs and states.88 MNCs in turn gained more economic power
within the international system from their interactions with
supra note 20, at 401 (noting increased influence MNC's had on organizing unions and
influencing politics in host countries).
83 See Wood & Scharffs, supra note 79, at 538-9 (noting that there may be between
35,000 to 37,000 multinational corporations as of early 1990s); see also Ayoub, surpa note
20, at 402 (discussing vast influence MNC's play in developing countries because of
economic constraints).
84 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
85 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting litigants
more frequently are seeking redress under ATCA with increased concerns for
international human rights); Koh, supra note 4, at 2366 (calling Filartiga the "Brown v.
Board of Education" for transnational public law litigants). See generally Stephens, supra
note 43, at 6 (stating Filartiga court held official torture is "prohibited by the law of
nations" and therefore triggers jurisdiction under the ATCA").
86 See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 88 (stating suit involved immigrants suing two foreign holding
companies alleging human rights violations against them in retaliation for political
opposition to companies' practices); Stephens, supra note 43, at 6 (discussing series of
decisions since 1980 which develop jurisdictional reach under ATCA); see also Bradley,
supra note 26, at 57 (noting ATCA suits predominantly involve claims of human rights
violations).
87 See Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 104-05 (discussing ratification in 1991 Act and its condemning
of international human rights abuses); Koh, supra note 4, at 2371 (noting the expansion of
transnational public law litigation). See generally Engle, supra note 13, at 105 (2004)
(discussing wide range of human rights violations internationally).
- See Shelton, supra note 9, at 278 (explaining the ramifications of globalization upon
international human rights law); see also Engle, supra note 13, at 105 (noting a number of
industries, such as "flowers, textiles, oil, and diamonds" present themselves to labor
exploitation). See generally Westfield, supra note 78, at 1077 (noting multinational
enterprises often are operating in places where actually adjust their laws to entice foreign
direct investment).
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developing countries.8 9 Their investments in such states resulted
in human rights violations. 90 Inevitably, they too would be swept
under ATCA litigation.
A. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: The Landmark Decision
On March 29, 1976 Joelito Filartiga was kidnapped and
tortured to death by Americo Norberto Pena-Irala in Asuncion,
Paraguay. 91 Pena-Irala was Inspector General of Police in
Paraguay at the time. 92 Joelito's torture and killing, was argued,
took place as revenge for his father's political beliefs. 93 The
Filartigas attempted to bring claims against Pena-Irala in
Paraguay but were unsuccessful. 94 In 1978, after moving to the
United States, the Filartigas learned of Pena-Irala's arrival in
the United States, and filed suit in the Eastern District of New
York.95 The Filartigas brought a wrongful death action under the
89 See Ayoub, supra note 20, at 401 (noting expansion into developing countries allows
MNC's to pay their workers "a pittiance"); see also Engle, supra note 13, at 105 (stating
"companies exploit third world labour because exploitation is profitable"). See generally
Westfield, supra note 78, at 1079 (suggesting accountability for violations should lie in
both the company's headquarters government as well as host country).
90 See Ayoub, supra note 20, at 402 (noting once international media became aware of
such practices, things had to change); see also Engle, supra note 13, at 105 (listing typical
violations as indentured servitude, child labour, and slave labour). See generally
Westfield, supra note 78, at 1081 (noting companies rationalize production abroad by
taking advantage of varying costs of labor, capital and raw materials).
91 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding whenever an alleged
torturer is found and served with process by an alien within US borders §1350 provides
jurisdiction); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
[hereinafter "Filartiga IT] (reviewing facts of case on remand from Second Circuit). See
generally Stephens, supra note 43, at 6 (stating 17 year old Filartiga was tortured in
killed because of father's political beliefs).
92 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (stating body of Filartiga was shown to his sister at
Inspector General's home); see also Filartiga II, 577 F. Supp. at 861 (stating Pena-Irala
was former Inspector General). See generally Stephens, supra note 43, at 6 (discussing
facts of case).
93 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (stating Filartiga's sister was chased after and
harassed by Pena-Irala after being shown the body); see also Filartiga II, 577 F. Supp. at
861 (stating torture and killing was due to father's opposition to President Alfredo
Stroessner's government). See generally Stephens, supra note 43, at 6 (noting Filartiga's
father was opposed to country's military dictatorship).
94 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (explaining Filartiga's attorney was arrested and
brought to police headquarters after commencing criminal action and shackled to a wall);
see also Filartiga II, 577 F. Supp. at 861 (explaining jurisdiction of Court of Appeals). See
generally Stephens, supra note 43, at 6 (discussing facts of case).
95 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879 (stating Pena was served while being held for
immigration purposes at Brooklyn Navy Yard after overstaying visitors visa); see also
Filartiga II, 577 F. Supp.at 861 (stating after remand back to Eastern District, Pena took
no further action, leading to a default judgment after which question of damages was
referred to Magistrate John L. Caden, which Plaintiffs filed objections to, bringing this
matter to this court for determination). See generally Stephens, supra note 43, at 6
(stating Filartiga's father and sister sued for Pena for his torture and death).
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ATCA. 96 The Filartigas claim under the ATCA was dismissed by
the Eastern District for lack of jurisdiction. 97 The court also held
that a violation of the law of nations did not include the law
governing a state's own treatment of its citizens.98
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal and found that the ATCA both granted federal courts
jurisdiction and presented the Filartigas with a cause of action.99
The court initially analyzed whether official torture violated
international law.100 For this determination, it noted that it was
relevant to examine current international law rather than the
international law that existed when the ATCA was first
enacted. 10 1 In deciding whether acts of torture committed by
government officials were violations of "customary international
96 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (discussing how the "Filartigas brought this action in
the Eastern District of New York against Americo Norberto Pena-Irala ... for wrongfully
causing the death of Dr. Filartiga's seventeen-year old son, Joelito"); see also Wiwa v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2000) (bringing a claim under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, the plaintiff alleged wrongful death among with other state tort
claims). See generally Lu, supra note 33, at 534 (stating that the "Second Circuit's
reversal of Filartiga in an opinion authored by Judge Irving R. Kaufman represents the
birth of the ATCA as a means for alien plaintiffs to assert jurisdiction in U.S. courts for
human rights violations worldwide").
97 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (stating that the district court dismissed the action for
want of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Filartiga II, 577 F. Supp at 861 (stating
district courts reasoning for believing it lacked jurisdiction). See generally Stephens,
supra note 43, at 6 (stating procedural history of case).
98 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 868 (noting courts reasoning); see Filartiga II, 577 F. Supp
at 880 (discussing how the district judge "felt constrained by dicta contained in two recent
opinions of this Court, ... to construe narrowly 'the law of nations,' as employed in § 1350,
as excluding that law which governs a state's treatment of its own citizens"). See generally
Stephens, supra note 43, at 6 (stating court's reasoning).
99 See F ilartiga, 630 F.2d at 885 (discussing jurisdictional question); see also Filartiga
II, 577 F. Supp. at 890 (stating that the court's holding gives effect to the jurisdictional
provision of the First Congress). See generally Stephens, supra note 43, at 7 (stating basis
for courts jurisdiction).
100 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (stating that the "threshold question on the
jurisdictional issue is whether the conduct alleged violates the law of nations"); Ratner,
supra note 37, at 95 (noting that "[t]he Filartiga court extensively inquired into 'the
sources from which [Customary International Law] is derived' in deciding whether or not
torture constituted a violation of the law of nations"). See generally Lu, supra note 33, at
534 (discussing how the critical issue was to define the "law of nations" under the ATCA).
1o See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (stating that "[clourts must interpret international law
not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world
today"); see also Alan Frederick Enslen, Note, Filartiga's Offspring: The Second Circuit
Significantly Expands the Scope of the Alien Tort Claim Act with Its Decision in Kadic v.
Karadzic, 48 ALA L. REV. 695, 704-05 (1997) (analyzing the opinion in Kadic v. Karadzic,
the author noted that "[t]he court once again relied on Filartiga .... in determining what
constitutes 'international law,' one should base his judgment upon the law's evolution to
date--and not upon a staunchly originalist viewpoint which may freeze the definition at a
point in the past"). See generally Ratner, supra note 37, at 94 (noting that "the Filartiga
court affirmed that specific norms of the law of nations are fluid and evolve over time").
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law," the court surveyed various sources of international law.10 2
Upon examining the practice of nations, judicial opinions, and
the works of legal scholars, the court concluded that customary
international law prohibited state sponsored torture of its
citizens.103 Therefore, Pena-Irala, acting under color of law,
committed a violation of the law of nations under the ATCA and
the Filartigas were entitled to compensatory and punitive
damages.1 04
B. Elements of an ATCA Claim Post-Filartiga
The Filartiga court's interpretation and analysis of the
ATCA105 led to increased litigation under the ATCA, particularly
in the area of human rights. Consequently, suits were brought
under similar situations as in Filartiga, involving claims of
customary international law violations by state officers. 0 6
102 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (discussing how different international law has
analyzed whether torture constituted violations); see also Filartiga II, 577 F. Supp. at 861
(reviewing findings of Second Circuit). See generally Stephens, supra note 43, at 4 (stating
that standard under Filartiga has been failed to have been recognized).
103 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (holding that "deliberate torture perpetrated under
color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of
human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties"); see also Ratner, supra note 37,
at 94 (discussing how "the Filartiga court elaborated that a violation must be one of
international concern, and not simply a norm that happens to be outlawed by several
independent nations"). See generally Lu, supra note 33, at 534-45 (mentioning the various
sources analyzed by the Supreme Court, it was concluded that although the Court noted
that proof of the "general assent of civilized nations" needed to demonstrate a violation of
the law of nations had to meet a stringent standard, the Filartiga court concluded that
official torture satisfied this standard).
104 See Filargita II, 577 F. Supp. at 860. On remand, the district judge awarded
judgment for plaintiff Dolly M. E. Filartiga in the amount of $5,175,000 and for plaintiff
Joel Filartiga in the amount of $5,210,364, a total judgment of $10,385,364. Id. at 867.
The landmark decision in this case attracted virtually no attention until the mid 1990's.
See generally Stephens, supra note 43 at 17.
105 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798-823 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(analyzing how Judge Bork examines that there is a minority view that argues ATCA
does not grant federal courts jurisdiction and a cause of action); see also Curtis A. Bradley
& Jack L. Goldsmith, III, Human Rights On the Eve of the Next Century: U.N. Human
Rights Standards & U.S. Law: The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights
Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 320-332 (1997) (discussing how in recent times, it is
argued that federal courts cannot ascertain customary international law because the
United States political branches have not determined the correct definition of customary
international law. Therefore, courts cannot label their findings as equivalent in status to
federal common law). See generally Ratner, supra note 37, at 97 (noting that "[t]he
majority of ATCA decisions have followed Filartiga's adoption of the [Customary
International Law] of human rights as the appropriate standard for adjudicating alleged
violations of the law of nations").
106 See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 169 (D. Mass. 1995) (discussing how
plaintiffs brought suit against the former Guatemalan Minister of Defense); see also
Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing how
plaintiff brought action under the Alien Tort Claims Act against Ghana's Deputy Chief of
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Plaintiffs subsequently brought suits against a variety of state
defendants, including former heads of state10 7 and, although
generally unsuccessful, foreign states. 108 The definition of "the
law of nations" was also broadened to include a variety of torts
claimed as violations of the law of nations. 109 The following
section outlines the basic ATCA claim against state officers.
1. Customary International Law Violations and State Action
As discussed above, the Filartiga court held that torture
committed by state actors was a violation of customary
international law. 110 Customary international law is defined as
law that "results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."11' Federal
courts have defined customary international law in the same
manner that the Second Circuit employed in Filartiga.112 They
have analyzed treaties, conventions, state practice, and opinions
National Security). See generally Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1995)
(discussing norms of international law).
107 See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1992)
(discussing how plaintiff brought suit against Ferdinand Marcos, former dictator of the
Philippines); see also Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 346-47 (2d Cir.
1986) (discussing plaintiffs appeal from grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Former President and First Lady of the Philippines);
Tachiona v. Magube, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (analyzing how plaintiffs,
citizens of Zimbabwe, brought suit against the Zimbabwe President and other Zimbabwe
government officials).
108 See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 380 (7th Cir. 1985)
(affirming the decision to dismiss plaintiffs suit against the U.S.S.R.); see also Hamid v.
Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissing plaintiffs suit under the
Alien Tort Statute against defendants including Abu Dhabi). See generally Argentine
Republic v. Amerida Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 431 (1989) (holding the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act was the only basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
state in U.S. courts).
109 See, e.g., Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 168 (discussing how the plaintiffs brought claims
for wrongful death, assault and battery, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress). But see Frolova, 761 F.2d at 370 (holding in favor of defendant
against plaintiffs claims for mental anguish, physical distress, and loss of consortium).
See generally Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238-39 (discussing how to determine international law).
110 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that deliberate
torture by official authority violates universally accepted norms of international law).
M See Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 307-08 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing
Restatement (Third) Foreign Relation Law § 102(2)).
112 See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992)
(examining how to recognize international law); see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238 (stating
that "[blecause the Alien Tort Act requires that plaintiffs plead a 'violation of the law of
nations' at the jurisdictional threshold, this statute requires a more searching review of
the merits to establish jurisdiction than is required under the more flexible 'arising under'
formula of §1331"). See generally Ratner, supra note 37, at 85 (noting that "States must
not only generally abide by the norm in practice, but must also feel constrained by
international consensus not to deviate from this practice").
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of legal commentators to arrive at the definition of current
international law. 113 Thus, courts have recognized torture,
1 4
arbitrary detention,11 5 disappearance," 6 and sexual assault 1 7 as
violations of customary international law when acted upon by
state officials. 11
The Filartiga court also noted customary international law
violations require proof of "state action" in order for a sufficient
113 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. One of the primary ways that international law is
determined is by looking to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ). There, the Court lists what the universal understanding of what is customary
international law. The Statute requires the ICJ to look to sources such as international
conventions, international customs, and general principles of law, judicial decision, and
the works of legal commentators. Thus, the federal courts seem to apply Article 38 in
their analyses. See also Ratner, supra note 37, at 95 wherein the author states that
"[t]he Second Circuit's methodology mirrored the Supreme Court's approach to
ascertaining whether a norm had attained the status of the law of nations, and relied on
numerous international agreements for positive evidence of general international assent."
But see In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992)
where the Ninth Circuit accepted Judge Bork's conclusion from Tel-Oren that no private
cause of action can be implied from customary international law and instead municipal
tort law should be applied.
114 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (stating that "having examined the sources from which
customary international law is derived the usage of nations, judicial opinions and the
works of jurists, we conclude that official torture is now prohibited by the law of
nations."); see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240 (noting that "[wie had no occasion to consider
whether international law violations other than torture are actionable against private
individuals, and nothing in Filartiga purports to preclude such a result"). See generally
Ratner, supra note 37, at 95-6 (discussing in detail how the Second Circuit has cited many
sources when have determined torture to be a violation of the law of nations).
"1 See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating
that the ATCA reaches violations of customary international law, including arbitrary
detention); Martinez v. City of L. A., 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming the
international prohibition against arbitrary detention); see also De Sanchez v. Banco Cent.
de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397 (5th Cir. 1985) (explaining that international law
recognizes the right not to be arbitrarily detained).
116 See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (describing
practices universally outlawed by international law); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,
969 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. La. 1997) (noting that international law prohibits states from
engaging in human rights abuses, including disappearance); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp. 162, 184 (D.Mass. 1995) (finding disappearance to constitute fully recognized
violation of international law).
117 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19263, at *28-29 (9th. Cir. Sept. 18, 2002) (recognizing that rape violates
international law), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th
Cir. Feb. 14, 2003); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-3 (explaining that rape committed in the course
of hostilities violates international law); In re Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp.
676, 682 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (describing rape as torture and a violation of international law).
11 See Beanel, 969 F. Supp. at 373-374 (noting that with the exception of genocide, state
action must be present in order for liability to fix for certain human rights abuses). See
generally Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (expanding liability for some violations of international
law from state actors to non-state actors); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 794-795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (observing that while most crimes require state action for
ATCA liability to attach, there are several for which individual actors can be liable).
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cause of action under the ATCA.119 Federal courts have
interpreted the "state action requirement" for violations of
customary international law by looking to our domestic "color of
law" jurisprudence. 120
Acting under "color of law" occurs when one "acts together with
state officials or with significant state aid. '121 Under this
jurisprudence, federal courts utilize four different tests in
determining whether state action exists under the ATCA: (1) the
nexus test, (2) the public function test, (3) the symbiotic
relationship test, or (4) the joint action test.122 The nexus test
requires proof of a substantially close "nexus" between the state
and the alleged conduct in order for the court to trace the action
back to the state. 123 The public function test is applicable where
"a private entity performs a function traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State."'124 The symbiotic relationship test may
be used where the state has so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with a private actor, that "it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity."'125
119 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (finding that acts of torture committed by state
officials against one held in detention violates established norms of the international law
of human rights and the law of nations). See generally Kadic 70 F.3d at 239 (explaining
that liability for violations of international law applies to state, and in some instances,
non-state actors); Beanel, 969 F.Supp. at 371 (discussing acts violative of international
law when committed by state actors).
120 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 (calling "color of law" jurisprudence under § 1983 relevant
to whether defendant has engaged in official action for purposes of jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Claims Act); see also Beanel, 969 F. Supp. at 380 (applying all four § 1983 tests
of state action to analyze conduct of corporate defendants under the ATCA); Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890-891 (C.D.Cal. 1997) (discussing applicability of § 1983 tests
of state action to ATCA claims).
121 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 (holding that subject-matter jurisdiction exists and that
defendant may be found liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in
his capacities as both private individual and state actor).
122 See Johnson v. Rodrigues, 293 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2002) (discussing four tests
used to determine whether private parties should be deemed state actors); Gallagher v.
Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th Cir. 1995) (describing four tests
under the state action doctrine); see also Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 376-377 (E.D. La. 1997)
(considering four tests used to determine whether private actors have engaged in state
conduct for purposes of § 1983).
123 See Johnson, 293 F.3d at 1203 (explaining that under the nexus test, plaintiff must
demonstrate a sufficiently close nexus between the government and the challenged
conduct); Gallagher, 49 F.3d. at 1447.1448 (describing the nature of the inquiry in the
nexus test); see also Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (outlining the
contours of the nexus test).
124 Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 379 (noting that state action can exist when private entities
performs functions traditionally the exclusive prerogative of states).
125 Id. at 378 (noting that state action can be established under the symbiotic
relationship test if the state "has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence" with private parties that "it must be recognized as a joint participant in
the challenged activity").
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Lastly, the joint action test is met where an individual is a
"willful participant in joint action with the state or its agents. ' 126
Federal courts were next confronted with the issue of whether
individuals acting in their individual capacities could be liable
under modern international law. 127 At first, federal courts were
hesitant to extend the ATCA's application to private actors,' 28
but they soon redefined their interpretation of international law
to adapt to the norm of non-state actor liability for certain
breaches of international law. 129
2. Non-State Actors and Violations of Jus Cogens Norms
In Kadic v. Karadzic, plaintiffs brought suit against Karadzic,
leader of the self-proclaimed and non-recognized Srpska republic,
located within Bosnia-Herzegovina.130 The plaintiffs claimed to
have suffered the torts of torture, rape, and murder as part of a
genocidal campaign by Serbian military forces at the order of
Karadzic. 131 The Southern District of New York dismissed for
126 Id. at 379 (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)).
127 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 792-793 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(discussing the potential application of international law to individuals for private acts).
See generally Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963)
(commenting that violation of the law of nations means "at least a violation by one or
more individuals"); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864-865 (D. MD. 1961) (finding misuse
of passports in child custody disputes violative of international law).
128 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792-793 (holding that the Palestine Liberation
Organization was not a state actor and thus not liable for torture under international
law). See generally De Sanchez v. Banco Cent. de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1396-1397
(5th Cir. 1985) (observing that despite erosion of distinctions between injuries to states
and to individuals, incorporation of human rights standards into the law of nations
remained limited); Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734, 739-740 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing
the evolution of applications of international law to encompass acts by private actors
against individuals), rev'd, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
129 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that certain forms of
conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under auspices of
states or as private individuals; Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,
244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 309-319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (surveying application of international law
to state actors, individual actors, and corporations); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F.
Supp. 3, 12-13 (D.D.C. 1998) (following Kadic in applying international law to private
actors).
130 See Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 736-737 (outlining facts giving rise to plaintiffs'
claims); see also Enslen, supra note 101, at 698-701 (describing factual background of the
Kadic v. Karadzic decision); Beth Ann Isenberg, Comment, Genocide, Rape, and Crimes
Against Humanity: An Affirmation of Individual Accountability in the Former Yugoslavia
in the Karadzic Actions, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1051, 1059-1060 (1997) (offering background on
Kadic v. Karadciz).
131 See Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 736 (describing torts allegedly inflicted by Bosnian-
Serb military forces under the command of defendant); Enslen, supra note 101, at 699
(outlining crimes and injuries allegedly committed at the direction of defendant);
Isenberg, supra note 131, at 1059-1060 (describing claims for which plaintiffs sought
relief).
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on a finding that private
actors could not violate the law of nations. 132
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and found that
individuals could be liable for certain violations of international
law. 133 The Court first categorized the plaintiffs' claims into three
categories: "genocide, war crimes, and other instances of
inflicting death, torture and degrading treatment."'3 4 The court,
analyzing international treaties and conventions, concluded that
genocide and war crimes were jus cogens norms, which by
definition could not be derogated by states or private
individuals.13 5 Further, the court reinforced the Filartiga holding
that torture only violates international law if committed by state
officers or those acting under color of law according to customary
international law. 136 It concluded Karadzic was liable for torture
even though he was not a state officer because the claimed acts
were committed in pursuit of genocide and war crimes. 137
132 See Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. at 744 (dismissing § 1331 claim for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction actions absent an express right of action granted by Congress); Enslen, supra
note 101, at 701 (describing district court's dismissal based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the ACTA); Isenberg, supra note 131, at 1060-1061 (analyzing reasons
for district court dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
133 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (holding "certain forms of conduct violate the law of
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as
private individuals"); Enslen, supra note 101, at 703-722 (describing Second Circuit's
decision to reverse district court dismissal and hold individuals liable under international
law); Isenberg, supra note 131, at 1062-1077 (analyzing Second Circuit decision to reverse
and hold individuals liable for violations of international law).
134 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241 (quoting judicial categorization of claims presented before
Second Circuit).
135 See id. at 241-43 (examining post-World War II conventions and treaties regarding
requirements for genocide and war crimes under international law); see also Genocide
Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988) (specifying that
"whoever" commits genocidal acts is punishable by statute without requiring person to be
private or state actor); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 150 (2d Cir. 2003)
(reiterating that war crimes and genocide violate international law whether committed by
state actors or private individuals).
136 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243 (holding that international law requires torture to be
committed by state actors); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980)
(finding that torturous acts carried out by state officials only will be violative of
international norms); see also Flores, 343 F.3d at 150 (following Kadic holding that
customary law is violated when executed by state actors).
137 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244 (clarifying that although acts are torturous under
customary international law, case must be remanded to determine if all statutory
elements satisfied). See generally Demian Betz, Note, Holding Multinational Corporations
Responsible for Human Rights Abuses Committed by Security Forces in Conflict-Ridden
Nations: An Argument Against Exporting Federal Jurisdiction for the Purpose of
Regulating Corporate Behavior Abroad, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 163, 173 (2001) (mentioning
how appellate court found Karadzic's actions torturous under international law); Enslen,
supra note 101, at 695 (noting Kadic decision and its expansion on torture in realm of
international law).
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Thus, the ATCA was further broadened in scope by the Second
Circuit to comply with modern international law. 138 The court
recognized genocide and war crimes as jus cogens norms under
international law. Jus cogens norms are defined as non-
derogable norms that may be violated by both states and
individuals. 39 This interpretation of the ATCA was consistent
with the Nuremberg trials, which imposed individual liability
upon German soldiers for committing acts of genocide. 40 Present
treaties and conventions also acknowledge that individuals may
be accountable for violations of jus cogens violations under
international law.' 4 ' Accordingly, modern international law was
consistently defined by the Second Circuit in finding Karadzic
liable. The holding in Kadic is also important for it is the basis of
accountability used to find the next class of defendants
accountable under the ATCA in the early 1990s, MNCs.142
138 'The Karadzic decision was also groundbreaking in that the court held that certain
international human rights norms were applicable to private actors as well as public
actors." Ramasastry, supra note 15, at 120. The Kadic decision has since been cited in
numerous federal courts cases that came after it. See, e.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67
F.Supp.2d 424, 439 (D.N.J. 1999); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, 969 F.Supp. 362, 371
(E.D. La. 1997).
139 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 8 I.L.M. 679,
697, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 344 [hereinafter "V.C.L.T."]. The V.C.L.T. defines a jus cogens
norm as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a
whole from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Some legal
scholars and courts have defined jus cogens norms to prohibit acts of genocide, piracy,
slave trade, and crimes against humanity. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain v. United States,
331 F.3d 604, 613 (9th Cir. 2003); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES, § 404 (1994).
140 See Carl E. Bruch, The Environmental Law of War: All's Not Fair in (Civil) War:
Criminal Liability for Environmental Damage in Internal Armed Conflict, 25 VT. L. REV.
695, 730 (2001) (noting that Nuremberg courts rejected idea of sovereign immunity as
protection from personal liability for genocidal acts). See generally Collingsworth, supra
note 21, at 191 (commenting on principle developed by Nuremberg tribunal that private
individuals can be liable); James McHenry, Justice for Foca: The International Criminal
Tribunal For Yugoslavia's Prosecution of Rape and Enslavement as Crimes Against
Humanity, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 183, 188-89 (2002) (listing crimes that were
charged at Nuremberg including war crimes and crimes against humanity).
141 See V.C.L.T, supra note 139, at 344 (adopting standard for nations involved that
private individuals are responsible for jus cogens violations, such as genocide or war
crimes); see also International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., para. 4, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (creating agreement that individuals responsible for war crimes or
genocide in Rwanda are accountable and must surrender). See generally United States v.
Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 94 (2d Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that customary international law
may "vitiate" treaty that directly violates jus cogens norms).
142 See William J. Aceves, International Decision: Doe v. Unocal, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 309,
312-13 (1998) (recognizing importance of Kadic decision on account of emergence of MNCs
worldwide); Kieserman, supra note 19, at 881-82 (noting how MNCs refuse to accept
responsibility for horrendous acts of host nations by claiming inability to become socially
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IV. MNC ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER THE ATCA
A. Application to MNCs
Application of the ATCA against an MNC was not successfully
employed until the Ninth Circuit decided Doe v. Unocal.143
Unocal, an American multinational corporation, owned a
subsidiary in Myanmar. 144 Through their subsidiary, Unocal
partook in a natural gas extraction project by setting up a
pipeline in Myanmar. 145 Because the project was not welcomed by
local population near the area, security was required and Unocal
allowed the Myanmar military to be hired to provide security
over the project. 146 Unocal was also aware of prior forced labor
practices exercised by the Myanmar military. The plaintiffs were
villagers from the adjacent area where Unocal's pipeline project
was based. 147 The plaintiffs brought suit against Unocal under
the ATCA for claims of forced labor, rape, murder, and torture
they had been subjected to by the Myanmar military.148 The
involved); see also Ramasastry, supra note 15, at 95 (identifying issue of accountability on
part of MNCs for their involvement or support of acts that violate customary
international norms, such as genocide or war crimes).
143 Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *1
(9th. Cir. 2002), reh'g granted, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716, at *1 (9th Cir. 2003).
141 See id. at *4-5 (discussing Unocal's participation in foreign nation of Myanmar); Doe
v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 885 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (outlining Unocal's position in
Myanmar and relationship with foreign government). See generally Ramasastry, supra
note 15, at 132 (identifying Unocal as American multinational participating in joint
venture with French multinational in Myanmar).
145 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *6 (specifying exact region of Myanmar
that Unocal and its accompanying partners were to lay down pipeline); Unocal, 963 F.
Supp. at 885 (discussing in detail all aspects of extraction project and pipeline installation
throughout Myanmar). See generally Aceves, supra note 142, at 310 (discussing Unocal's
project in Myanmar, including development of natural gas fields and installing pipeline
throughout country).
146 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *6 (recognizing Unocal's rationale in
hiring Myanmar military for security in region where pipelines were being laid down). See
generally Betz, supra note 137, at 167-68 (discussing role of Myanmar military as security
measure due to village opposition of regional labor practices); Alex Markels, Showdown
for a Tool in Rights Litigation, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2003, § 3, at 11 (stating how Unocal
needed to pay military for protection while building pipelines).
147 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *11 (noting who brought claims against
Unocal in this suit); Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 883 (commenting on plaintiffs livelihood as
farmers in Tenasserim region of Burma). See generally Leslie Wells, A Wolf in Sheep's
Clothing: Why Unocal Should be Liable Under U.S. Law for Human Rights Abuses in
Burma, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 35, 38-39 (1998) (describing both parties to claim).
148 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *12 (listing grounds under which
plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to ATCA); Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 883 (noting claims of
villagers in class action suit on behalf of all who suffered grave atrocities). See generally
Markels, supra note 146, at 11 (highlighting threats and atrocities by Myanmar military
towards villagers who eventually brought suit).
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California district court granted Unocal's motion for summary
judgment because it did not find that plaintiffs had shown
Unocal had "actively participated" in the forced labor. 149
The Ninth Circuit reversed and found Unocal could be liable
for "aiding and abetting" the Myanmar military in committing
violations of international law. 150 The court's analysis first began
by defining forced labor as a violation of modern international
law. 151 The court then cited to Kadic in explaining specific
situations where private actors could be liable under the ATCA
for violations of jus cogens norms, thereby not requiring proof of
state action.1 52 It determined forced labor was the modern day
equivalent of slavery and, therefore, a violation of a jus cogens
norm.1 53 The court subsequently turned to international criminal
law to define the aiding and abetting standard as "knowing,
practical assistance, or encouragement that has a substantial
effect on the perpetration of the crime."1 54 Applying this aiding
149 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *25 (summarizing District Court
dismissal); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1306 (C.D.Cal. 2000) (explaining
why Unocal not responsible for any claims brought under ATCA). See generally Tawny
Aine Bridgeford, Note & Comment, Imputing Human Rights Obligations on Multinational
Corporations: The Ninth Circuit Strikes Again in Judicial Activism, 18 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1009, 1034 (2003) (noting California district court's decision for not finding Unocal
liable).
150 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *55 (concluding that aiding and
abetting is identifiable here as to Unocal, but genuine issues of material fact exist as to
elements of claim for lower court to resolve); cf. Barrueto v. Larios, 205 F.Supp.2d 1325,
1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (noting that conspiracy to aid and abet is also violative of customary
international norms). See generally Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 2002: Sixteenth Annual Survey, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 49-50
(reiterating Ninth Circuit's decision to remand aiding and abetting claim to district court).
151 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *29 (referring to court's initial step in
determining violation of international law existed); see also Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.,
67 F.Supp.2d 424, 440 (D.N.J. 1999) (acknowledging that forced labor is violation of
customary international law). See generally Peter Moser, Restitution Negotiations - The
Role of Diplomacy, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 197, 198 (2002) (noting that forced labor has
been international violation since 1907).
12 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *30 (recognizing Kadic as source for
holding private actors liable for jus cogens violations); see also supra note 135 and
accompanying text (discussing Kadic holding). See generally Aceves, supra note 142, at
312-13 (specifying how court expanded Kadic holding to private corporations in addition
to private individuals).
153 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *32 (finding forced labor does not
require state action); see also Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp 445, 450 (E.D. Wis.
1974) (stating forced labor of particular classes of people constitutes thirteenth
amendment violation). See generally Pollack v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) (explaining
purpose of Thirteenth amendment was to implement market of "completely free and
voluntary labor throughout the United States").
154 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *35-36. The court determined that the
standard for aiding and abetting in our domestic tort law was similar to that under
international criminal law. It noted how several district courts had looked to international
criminal law in determining which standard to use when analyzing international human
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and abetting standard, evidence existed to create a material
question of fact as to whether forced labor had been used in
connection with the pipeline project. 155 The court did not find
proof of "state action" was required in proving acts of murder and
rape because these acts were committed in furtherance of forced
labor, a jus cogens norm.156 However, the court did note Unocal
would only be lYable for the crime of torture with a showing of
"state action" 5 7' asE required under the Filartiga holding. Thus,
the international norm of individual responsibility was held to
extend to MNCs.158
The Unocal decision is viewed as a step forward for human
rights activists who have long advocated for corporate
accountability for violations of human rights law. 159 Since the
Unocal decision, other corporations have yet to be found
accountable under the ATCA. 160  This decision has placed
rights law under the ATCA. Id. at 44-45. The court then looked to the decisions of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in determining the correct standard used in
international law. Id at 45.
155 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *51-53 (explaining how testimony of
witnesses could lead factfinder to conclude actus reus requirement satisfied); Linda A.
Malone, Exercising Environmental Human Rights and Remedies in the United Nations
System, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV 365, 368 n.2 (2002) (stating allegations
that corporation aided and abetted the military government in forced labor, torture and
rape); see also John Quigley, American Style in International Human Rights Adjudication,
19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 249, 250 (2003) (describing allegations of plaintiffs as
based on corporation facilitation).
156 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *36-57 (concluding "active
participation" standard inappropriate in this situation); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding state action is not requirement for liability pursuant
to the ATCA); Malone, supra note 155, at 368 n.2 (explaining complaint based on the
ATCA is exception to state action requirement in federal court).
157 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *58 (noting record indicates issue of
material fact regarding murder and rape charges); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining broad and current interpretation of ATCA); Brian
C. Free, Comment, Awaiting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.: Advocating the Cautious Use of
Executive Opinion in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POLY J. 467, 471
(2003) (describing scope of Filartiga holding as applying to current societal standards).
158 See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating
jus cogens violation is not mandatory to satisfy standard); Natalie L. Bridgeman, Human
Rights Under the ATCA as a Proxy For Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV.
L.J. 1, 8 n.27 (2003) (explaining holding in Unocal extends to violations of current
international standards that are not jus cogens violations); see also Free, supra note 157,
at 472 (concluding ATCA claims are important ,components of corporate liability for
human rights violations).
159 See Malone, supra note 155, at 365 (noting human rights activists can provide
remedy for human and environmental damages); see also Bridgeman, supra note 158, at 2
(stating that the ATCA has developed into feasible method for liability abroad with
human rights violations); Free, supra note 157, at 472 (explaining human rights activists
have sued MNCs under the ATCA).
160 See generally Aldana v. Del Monte, No. 01-3399, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 24343, at *2
(S.D.Fla 2003) (dismissing ATCA claim filed by Guatemalan citizens against defendants
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corporations on notice because of the likelihood further suits will
be filed against them in light of the ongoing human rights
violations in countries with which they or their subsidiaries
continue to contract with.' 61
B. Possible Applications to MNCs
Current application of the ATCA makes MNCs potentially
liable for violations of international law under two standards:
violations with proof of "state action" or violations of jus cogens
norms. Legal commentators have also stated MNCs may be
found to violate customary international law through the notion
of "corporate complicity."'162 Corporate complicity occurs when
MNCs are found acting as accomplices to violations of
international law acted upon by the host states. 163 These
commentators have identified three categories of corporate
complicity, 164 which include direct complicity, indirect complicity,
alleging human rights violations). But see Bangor v. Citizens Communs. Co., No. 02-183-
B-S, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16667, at *6 (D. Me 2003) (recommending court deny motion to
dismiss claim against third party defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction);
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 314 n.24
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (concluding that even though Unocal decision was ordered for rehearing,
there is "overwhelming precedent" for proposition that corporations are liable under the
ATCA).
161 See Talisman, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 314 n.24 (noting many courts have upheld claims of
human rights violations under ATCA against multinational corporations); Bridgeman,
supra note 158, at 4 (stating the ATCA is viable method for bringing claims against
corporations for environmental abuses); see also Free, supra note 157, at 473 (commenting
on expert predictions of increased litigation against corporations following Unocal
decision).
162 See Ramasastry, supra note 15, at 92 n.4 (noting the term corporate complicity was
first used by the non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch); see also John
Haberstroh, Note, In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation and
Obstacles to International Human Rights Claims in U.S. Courts, 10 ASIAN L.J. 253, 280
(2003) (explaining how to establish private individual liability). See generally Craig
Forcese, Note, ATCA's Achilles Heel: Corporate Complicity, International Law and the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 487, 493 (2001) (noting definition of complicity).
163 See Ramasastry, supra note 15, at 100 (defining corporate complicity); see also
Talisman, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 296 (stating plaintiffs claim alleging defendant's complicity
with government); Forcese, supra note 162, at 509 (noting courts have found corporate
complicity in situations similar to "color of law" matters).
164 See Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human
Rights Abuses, (Mar. 21, 2001), available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Home
(outlining and explaining three categories of corporate complicity); see also Bridgeford,
supra note 149, at 1028 n.91 (noting direct complicity depends on whether corporation
"knowingly benefits from human rights abuses"). See generally Ramasastry, supra note
15, at 101 (explaining categories Clapham and Jerbi have noted in their article on
corporate complicity).
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and "mere presence in the country, coupled with complicity
through silence or inaction." 165
1. Jus Cogens Violations
MNCs may be accountable for violations of jus cogens norms
through direct complicity or by directly committing such
violations under- the Kadic holding. 166 There are a limited group
of jus cogens norms, which exist under international law and are
recognized by federal courts. 167 Such recognized jus cogens norms
are those prohibiting acts of piracy, war crimes, genocide, crimes
against humanity, and slavery.168
As was noted, the Unocal redefined forced labor as the modern
day equivalent of slavery, 169 thereby expanding the possible
application to MNCs in light of their use of labor abroad. It has
been established that during World War II, MNCs profited from
slave labor that occurred in their manufacturing plants
abroad.170 Further, Unocal holds that plaintiffs could bring suits
165 Ramasastry, supra note 15, at 101 (listing this as the third category of corporate
complicity).
166 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding state action is not
requirement for liability pursuant to ATCA); Bridgeford, supra note 149, at 1028 n.91
(explaining direct complicity is based on foreseeable detrimental effects caused by
assistance); see also Ramasastry, supra note 15, at 100 (specifying ways corporation may
be liable for violating international law).
167 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1994) [hereinafter
"Restatement"] (listing jus cogens norms as those which states may exercise universal
jurisdiction over); see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239, 240 n.3 (reviewing list of violations of
international law); Free, supra note 157, at 471 (noting that since Filartiga, courts have
allowed various abuses that constitute violations).
16 See Restatement, supra note 167 (listing jus cogens norms as those which states may
exercise universal jurisdiction over); see also Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239, 240 n.3 (reviewing list
of violations of international law); Free, supra note 157, at 471 (noting that since
Filartiga, courts have allowed various abuses that constitute violations).
169 Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19263 (9th. Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), at *32 (finding forced labor does not require state
action), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir. Feb. 14,
2003); see also Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp 445, 450 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (stating
forced labor of particular classes of people constitutes thirteenth amendment violation).
See generally Pollack v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) (explaining purpose of thirteenth
amendment was to implement market of "completely free and voluntary labor throughout
the United States").
170 See In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 942-3
(N.D. Cal 2000). The district court dismissed the suit finding the 1951 Treaty of Peace
with Japan settled any claims of reparations Allied nationals had against Japan and
therefore waived any claims plaintiffs held. Id. at 949. In re World War II was decided
prior to Unocal and plaintiffs did not invoke the ATCA because they were U.S. citizens.
Arguably, foreign nationals of the Allied nations could bring forth suit under the ATCA in
the Ninth Circuit against foreign corporations involved in such practices during WWII.
See also Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and
Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 74 n.162 (2002), for a discussion regarding
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against MNCs for such forced labor violations. 171 This concept
can further be extended to MNCs who use child labor in their
foreign production plants17 2 if federal courts choose to interpret
child labor under the definition of forced labor.' Moreover, MNCs
may also be directly liable for committing violations of customary
international law like torture, committed in furtherance of any
jus cogens norms. 173 It is doubtful MNCs have directly committed
violations of jus cogens norms since it is the host governments
with whom they contract who are directly involved in the actual
commission of violations. 174 However, it is possible that such
regimes could commit a genocidal campaign while under contract
with MNCs and therefore pass on liability to MNCs under the
Kadic finding of individual accountability for acts committed in
the furtherance ofjus cogens violations. 175
pharmaceutical industry involvement. For discussion about Japanese corporations use of
forced labor, see Haberstroh, supra note 162, at 254-5.
171 See Unocal, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at *83 (reversing district court judgment
which granted summary judgment in favor of corporation for ATCA claims); see also
Talisman, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 314 n.24 (concluding that even though Unocal decision was
ordered for rehearing, there is "overwhelming precedent" for proposition that corporations
are liable under ATCA); Free, supra, note 157, at 473 (commenting on expert predictions
of increased litigation against corporations following Unocal decision).
172 See Small Change, Bonded Child Labor in India's Silk Industry, Human Rights
Watch India, (Jan. 2003) available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/india (exposing
how child labor is still rampant in India's silk industry, with children labeled
"untouchables" predominantly involved); see also Bullard, supra note 17, at 175 (stating
MNCs promote full time employment of underage children); Jenness Duke, Enforcement
of Human Rights on Multi-National Corporations: Global Climate, Strategies and Trends
for Compliance, 28 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 339, 345 (2000) (discussing resulting effects
when MNCs "rush" to low wage markets where child labor exists).
1'3 See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (disagreeing that laws of nation confine their reach only to
state action); Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for
Violating International Law, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 81, 87 (1999) (discussing
trend in recent cases stating MNCs may be held directly liable for violating norms of
customary international law); see also Ramasastry, supra note 15, at 150 (listing types of
crimes for which an MNC can be directly liable).
174 See Ramasastry, supra note 15, at 92 (classifying most MNCs as accomplices to the
host government); see also Sarah M. Hall, Note, Multinational Corporations' Post- Unocal
Liabilities for Violations of International Law, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 401, 404
(2002) (explaining how in recent civil actions, acts complained of were usually joint
ventures between MNCs and foreign host governments). See generally Zia-Zarifi, supra
note 173, at 86-87 (discussing interplay between MNCs and host governments).
175 See generally Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238-39 (discussing how to determine what is
international law); Enslen, supra note 101, at 705 (explaining how court determined what
constitutes international law); W. Fletcher Fairey, Comment, The Helms-Burton Act: The
Effect ofInternational Law on Domestic Implementation, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 1289, 1295 n.26
(1997) (noting courts may use various sources to establish international law principles).
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2. Customary International Law Violations and State Action
MNCs may violate customary international law under all three
categories of complicity. MNCs may be accountable for aiding a
foreign government and, therefore, acting as an accomplice or as
a joint actor complicit in "state action" violating customary
international law. 176 Proof of "state action" was successful under
the joint action 'test in Unocal.177 Consequently, plaintiffs may
find it easier to prove "state action" under this test to show
complicity.
One major obstacle for plaintiffs bringing suits against MNCs
under the ATCA is pleading a recognized violation of
international law. 78  For example, plaintiffs have been
unsuccessful pleading claims of environmental harm as a
violation of the law of nations. The Fifth Circuit has not found
environmental law claims to have reached the status of
customary international law in Beanel v. Freeport McMoRan.179
Similarly, "cultural genocide" has yet to achieve the status of
customary international law. °80 Arguably, because customary
international law is continually evolving in light of state practice,
176 See Ramasastry, supra note 15, at 100 (discussing ways in which MNCs may be
accountable for violations). But see Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Reconciling
Political Sanctions With Globalization and Free Trade: Economic Sanctions: Public Goals
and Private Compensation, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 305, 327 (2003) (positing that MNCs could
end up not investing in business in developing countries if they find themselves punished
from their liability); Lucinda Saunders, Note, Rich and Rare are the Gems They War:
Holding De Beers Accountable for Trading Conflict Diamonds, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1402, 1454 (2001) (claiming evidence of MNCs' participation in violations of international
law can be hard to obtain).
177 See Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 U.S.
App. LEXIS 19263 (9th. Cir. Sept. 18, 2002), at *107-12 (describing joint venture liability
and that plaintiffs should proceed to trial under it), vacated and reh'g en banc granted,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2003). See generally Ramasastry, supra
note 15, at 146-49 (explaining state action test and international law); Erin L. Borg, Note,
Sharing the Blame for September Eleventh: The Case for a New Law to Regulate the
Activities of American Corporations Abroad, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 607, 619-22
(2003) (discussing interplay of state action requirement and MNC liability).
178 See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan Inc, 969 F. Supp. 362, 384 (E.D.La. 1997)
(affirming district court's dismissal), affl'd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Saunders, supra
note 176, at 1453-54 (describing plaintiffs as having to plead "high factual threshold" to
have continuation of case under the ATCA); see also Zia-Zarifi, supra note 173, at 123
(noting ATCA plaintiffs encounter steep factual barriers to recovery).
179 969 F. Supp. 363, affd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
180 See id. at 373 (discussing problems with claim of "cultural genocide"). But see
Stefanie Ricarda Roos, Development Genocide and Ethnocide: Does International Law
Curtail Development-Induced Displacement Through the Prohibition of Genocide and
Ethnocide?, 9 HuM. RTS. BR. 14, 17 (2002) (opining that in certain contexts, "cultural
genocide" may ascend to levels of customary international law). See generally Genocide
Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2004) (defining offense of
genocide).
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such violations may eventually be recognized as valid violations
of international law.' 8 '
Successful claims of violations against MNCs of economic,
social, and cultural rights are likely to come under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).18 2 The UDHR, which
specifically sets forth the principle that non-state actors are
liable for violations of human rights, 8 3 has existed for over forty
years, and parts of it are viewed as customary international
law.184 In light of state practice and the length of time it has
existed, courts could arguably find the principles set forth under
the UDHR are jus cogens norms or at the very least customary
international law. 8 5 Further proof of the status of economic,
social, and cultural rights as customary international law is
exemplified in the International Covenant on Cultural and
181 See generally Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting
constantly changing and "evolving" international law); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 881 (2d Cir. 1979) (claiming courts must interpret international law in its evolved
state); Roger D. Scott, Note & Comment, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and
International Law, 46 A.F. L. REV. 217, 217 (1999) (exemplifying situations where
international law has evolved).
182 See Universal Declaration, supra note 59, at pmbl. (recognizing inherent dignity of
members of "human family"); see also Rhoda E. Howard, Capitalism and Human Rights, 5
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 283, 288 (1999) (exhibiting why multinational enterprises must
behave with regard to human rights); Ramasastry, supra note 15, at 95-96 (stating MNCs
have important role in protecting human rights).
183 See Universal Declaration, supra note 59, at art. 30 (setting forth in Article 30 that
any "State, group or person" may not engage in activity destructive of rights set forth in
declaration); see also Shelton, supra note 9, at 284 (stating that Universal Declaration
provides foundation for application of human rights law to non-state actors). See generally
Ronald C. Slye, International Human Rights Law in Practice: International Law, Human
Rights Beneficiaries, and South Africa: Some Thoughts on the Utility of International
Human Rights Law, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 59, 69-70 (2001) (explaining that application of
human rights law to non-state activity is "growing area of inquiry").
184 See Stephens, supra note 1, at 81 (stating that Universal Declaration is "now
considered to be binding, in important part, if not in total"); see also Hurst Hannum, The
Status and Future of the Customary International Law of Human Rights: The Status of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 319 (1995/1996) (recognizing how many see Universal Declaration
as "contributing to the development of customary law of human rights binding on all
states"). But see August Reinisch, Note & Comment, Developing Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic
Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 851, 862 (2001) (claiming there is no consensus that rights in
Universal Declaration represent established customary law).
185 See generally Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses
Against Accused, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235, 238 (1996) (stating Universal Declaration reflects
some jus cogens norms to considerable extent); Henry J. Richardson III, The Gulf Crisis
and African-American Interests Under International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 75 n. 154
(1993) (saying that Universal Declaration principles "unquestionably" qualify as
customary international law); Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Top of
the Spear, 51 A.F. L. REV. 1, 75 (2001) (positing how many provisions of Universal
Declaration reflect customary international law).
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Political Rights (ICCPR).18 6 The CESCR came into force over
twenty years ago and has been ratified by 146 countries.18 7 The
CESCR establishes all people as having the right to paid labor
and sanitary working conditions. 88 It has been noted that some
MNCs' foreign factories operate under dangerous working
conditions or pay low salaries. 8 9 Federal courts may use the
CESCR as evidence of customary international law against low
wages or poor working conditions -and apply it to MNCs based on
Unocal's holding and the general trend of proscribing labor and
human rights violations.
V. A JUSTIFICATION FOR MNC ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER THE
ATCA
While it is evident that MNCs can be liable for violations of
international human rights law, this Note further argues that it
186 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 ) [hereinafter
"ICESCR"]. The ICESCR provides substantive definitions of economic, social, and cultural
rights including rights related to fair labor and livable conditions. The United States is a
signatory to the ICCPR. A general overview of the ICESCR the Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights is available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/
fsl6.htm#3 (last visited Apr. 18, 2004). However, some feel that ICESCR is "short about
the foundations of human rights in moral and political thought." See, e.g., James A. Gross,
A Human Rights Perspective on United States Labor Relations Law: A Violation of the
Right of Freedom of Association, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL J. 65, 66-67 (1999). For
the most part, however, the ICESCR is viewed as advancing a significant change in
international law. See generally Rick Sarre, Seeking Jusitice: Critical Perspectives of
Native People: The Imprisonment of Indigenous Australians: Dilemmas and Challenges for
Policymakers, 4 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y REV. 165, 167 (1999).
187 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of
Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (Nov. 2, 2003),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (listing ratifying countries); see also
Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM.
J. INTL L. 531, 546-47 (2002) (telling which countries were among first to ratify ICCPR).
See generally Thomas M. Frank, Of Gnats and Camels: Is There a Double Standard at the
United Nations?, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 811, 820-821 (1984) (discussing requirements of
ICCPR).
188 See ICESCR, supra note 186, at art. 7 (articulating such rights of people); see also
Yuri I. Luryi, Legal Problems of Vocational and Professional Training During the Soviet
Period of Stagnation, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 607, 616 (1994) (quoting work rights mentioned
in ICESCR); Neil A. Friedman, Comment, A Human Rights Approach to the Labor Rights
of Undocumented Workers, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1715, 1729 (1986) (mentioning work rights and
labor standards guaranteed in ICESCR).
189 See Stephens, supra note 1, at 52 (noting that investigations have found Disney,
Nike, and Levi Straus have factories where abuses such as "unpaid overtime, child labor,
illegally low wages and dangerous working conditions" exist); Borg, supra note 177, at 609
(detailing unfair labor practices MNCs are accused of committing); see also Ryan P.
Toftoy, Note, Now Playing: Corporate Codes of Conduct in the Global Theater. Is Nike Just
Doing It?, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 905, 905-06 (1998) (setting forth international labor
abuses in which MNCs engage).
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is justified for MNCs to be held accountable under the ATCA for
international law violations. The ATCA may only be applied
when federal courts have jurisdiction over defendants.
Consequently, the United States is not crossing its jurisdictional
boundaries. 190 Additionally, the ATCA has been held to give
plaintiffs a cause of action. 191 Also, as above, plaintiffs must
plead a violation of international law. 192 Thus, -certain activities
have not been deemed violative international law norms.
Consequently, the application of the ATCA will be persistent
with current international law. 193 In applying the ATCA, federal
courts are therefore not stepping outside of jurisdictional
boundaries. 94 This is the legal justification; however, there are
additional societal justifications for why MNCs should also be
held accountable under the ATCA.
190 See generally Zia-Zarifi, supra note 173, at 146 (opining that "[wihile no American
court has yet found an MNC liable under ATCA, I believe that such an outcome is certain
in the near future"); Logan Michael Breed, Note, Regulating Our 21st-Century
Ambassadors: A New Approach to Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations
Abroad, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1005, 1013-14 (2002) (stating U.S. courts only recognize limited
claims under ATCA, leaving many human rights violations of MNCs outside its scope);
Ariadne K. Sacharoff, Note, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They be Held Liable
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 927,
930 (1998) (claiming MNCs must be held liable for human rights violations and move
towards such liability should be made under ATCA).
191 See Abebe-Jira v. Negweo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the
Alien Tort Claims Act provides a federal forum for violations of international law);
Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (noting private
right of action for plaintiffs under ATCA); see also 28 U.S.C. 1350 (2004) (granting district
courts original jurisdiction over civil actions by an alien tort committed in violation of
United State law).
192 See id. (stating that there must be a "violation of the law of nations); Papa v. United
States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that plaintiffs must plead violation of
"international norms"); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)
(explaining that "actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is
specific, universal, and obligatory").
193 But see Michael D. Ramsey, Multinational Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act: Some Structural Concerns, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 361, 372-75
(2001) (discussing doctrinal problems with ATCA and international law). See generally
John F. Carella, Comment, Of Foreign Plaintiffs and Proper Fora, Forum Non Conveinens
and ATCA Class Actions, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 717, 722 (2003) (noting that "several aspects of
international law support Congress's endorsement of the ATCA"); Lu, supra note, 33 at
548 (observing that United States courts must first interpret § 1350 before evaluating
international law).
191 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (noting
jurisdictional elements under ATCA); Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F.
Supp. 542, 548 (D.D.C. 1981), affld, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (listing three elements
that must be present for jurisdiction to vest under § 1350, namely that the claim must be
made by an alien, it must be for a tort, and the tort must be in violation for the law of
nations or the treaties of the United States); see also 28 U.S.C. 1350 (conferring
jurisdiction on district courts).
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First, MNCs possess enormous power in terms of their wealth
and size, exerting formidable control over host countries. 195 They
are in the best position to see that human rights norms are
followed. Furthermore, their stature equates them to that of
states. Second, MNCs' conduct abroad is not governed by any
international organization or host states. 196  In addition,
voluntary corporate codes of conduct are inefficient as is
evidenced with the presently continuing human rights abuses.
197
Lastly, MNCs as legal persons and global citizens, have moral
and ethical duties in international society. 198 Consequently, the
federal courts' application of the ATCA is a justified
internalization of current international human rights norms
upon MNCs.
195 See Douglas M. Branson, The Globalization of Corporate and Securities Law in the
Twenty-first Century: The Social Responsibility of Large Multinational Corporations, 16
TRANSNAT'L LAW 121, 130-33 (2002) (discussing the enormous size of multinational
corporations); see also Joel R. Paul, Holding Multinational Corporations Responsible
Under International Law, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 285-87 (2001)
(hypothesizing that globalization has conferred vast amounts of wealth on multinational
corporations); Jennifer M. Siegle, Comment, Suing U.S. Corporations in Domestic Courts
For Environmental Wrongs Committed Abroad Through the Extraterritorial Application of
Federal Statutes, 10 U. MIAMI. Bus. L. REV. 393, 394 (2002) (noting the MNCs are
"important economic assets" which host countries do not want to lose).
196 See Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law v. Corporate Liability for
Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2045 n.129
(2001) (suggesting setting up an international civil court to adjudicate human rights
claims against MNCs); see also Paul, supra note 195, at 286-90 (contrasting United
States lack of participation in international tribunals with marked increase of private
plaintiffs seeking redress against multinational corporations in domestic courts). See
generally Carella, supra note 193, at 122 (noting that while United States is not a
member of International Criminal Court, they do recognize the international law doctrine
of universal jurisdiction).
197 See Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a Break for
Sweatshop Garment Workers, 34 LOY. U. CHIt. L.J. 291, 312 n.165 (2003) (discussing
failure of voluntary codes); Saunders, supra note 176, at 1436-37 (noting lack of serious
standards to deal with MNCs); see also Steven Greenhouse, Groups Reach Agreement for
Curtailing Sweatshop, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at A20 (summarizing code of conduct set
up to curtail sweatshops).
198 See Jacques de Lisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A "Sinical"
Look at the Use of U.S. Litigation to Address Human Rights Ambushes Abroad, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 492 (2002) (noting corporate responsibility and "human rights
duties"); see also Anderson, supra note 13, at 468 (commenting that while a moral duty
cannot be forced on a corporation, they should have a legal duty to respect human rights);
Ratner, supra note 55, at 461-66 (discussing need for corporate responsibility for
protecting human rights).
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A. The Economic Power of MNCs
The end of the Cold War further opened the doors to
globalization. 199 Trade liberalization led to MNCs further
investing in newly independent states and lesser-developed
countries.200  MNCs are enormously wealthy and at times
economically more powerful than developed countries. 20 1 In a
recent survey comparing revenues of states and MNCs, only
seven countries had larger economies than General Motors.20 2
Such wealth arguably places MNCs at a huge advantage in their
relations with developing countries.
A "liberal view" defines MNCs as powerful entities controlling
the relations of developing countries. 20 3 Consequently, developing
199 See FREEMAN, supra note 53, at 149 (stating "[tihe end of the Cold war was a victory
of liberal capitalism over authoritarian socialism..."); see also Reed, supra note 1, at 221
(arguing the end of the Cold War has accelerated "the globalization of commerce and
telecommunications"). See generally Ratner supra note 55, at 458 (discussing expansion
of globalization after at the end of the Cold War).
200 See Ellinikos, supra note 20, at 1 (noting American MNCs expanded operations to
countries in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe); see also Reed, supra note 1, at
224-25 (discussing the growth and role of MNCs since the end of the Cold War). See
generally Ruti G. Teitel, Theoretical and International Framework: Transitional Justice in
a New Era, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 893, 895-97 (2003) (discussing nation building after
the cold war).
201 Unilever-Best has an annual turnover that exceeds the gross domestic product of
most countries, including Kenya and Ecuador. See Branson, supra note 195, at 131.
According to United Nation statistics, multinationals are wealthier than over one
hundred twenty nation members of the United Nations. See Bruce Mazlish, Perspectives
on Globalization from Developing States: A Tour of Globalization, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG.
STUD. 5, 11-12 (1999). The Corporate Globalization Fact Sheet notes that Venezuela's
gross domestic product is less than Royal Dutch Shell's total revenues and that Wal-
Mart's revenues are also larger than Indonesia's gross domestic product. See Corporate
Globalization Fact Sheet, Corporate Watch, Mar. 22, 2001, available at,
http://www.corpwatch.org/ issues/PID.jsp?articleid=378 (last visited Mar. 5, 2004)
(Hereinafter "Fact Sheet").
202 See Global Policy Forum, Comparison of Revenues Among States and TNCs, May 10,
2000 (showing that only seven countries, United States, Germany, Italy, the United
Kingdom, Japan, France, and the Netherlands have larger economies than General
Motors as of May 10, 2000), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncsl
tncstat2.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2004); see also Stephens, supra note 1, at 57 n.59 (citing
to Global Policy Forum). See generally Cassel, supra note 10, at 1979 (quoting fact that
"Ford's economy is larger than Saudi Arabia's and Norway's").
203 See THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE, CHARTERS, CARTELS,
AND MULTINATIONALS, Chapter I at 17 (defining "liberal view" as placing MNCs as their
own financial enterprises with their own jurisdictions). See generally David Weissbrodt &
Muria Kruger, Current Development: Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 901, 907-09 (2003) (discussing competing definitions of transnational and
multinational corporations); Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New
Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 739, 740 (1970) (defining a
multinational enterprise as "a cluster of corporations of diverse nationality joined
together by ties of common ownership and responsive to a common management
strategy").
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countries find MNC investment appealing in the hopes of
bringing wealth to their countries. 20 4 To attract foreign direct
investment, these governments strive to offer the cheapest labor
and natural resources to MNCs. 20 5 They may also feel obligated
to relax labor standards206 and are less likely to reprimand
violators of human rights laws for fear of losing MNC
investment. 20 7 While -these host states have a duty to enforce
human rights norms, they will unlikely become involved in
litigation that would detract foreign direct investment. 208
However, the absence of action against MNCs for violations of
human rights law by host states does not detract from MNCs'
duties under international law.
As a result of their power in relations with developing
countries, MNCs can have a significant impact on human rights.
MNCs are influential in ensuring countries they contract with
abide and respect international law because they hold the power
204 The dominant neo-liberal ideology has meant that developing countries are now
more open than ever to foreign direct investment by MNCs.. Developing countries, in
order to attract foreign investment, come under pressure not only to reduce public
expenditure but also to reduce the burden on MNCs in such areas as workplace safety
and environmental protection.
FREEMAN, supra note 53, at 156; see also Reed, supra note 1, at 226; Kieserman, supra
note 19, at 911.
205 See Ellinikos, supra note 20, at 1 (arguing that American MNCs look for foreign
states that are "willing to subject their people to slave and forced labor and exploit these
foreign labor sources to reap large profits"); see also Ping Lu, Corporate Codes of Conduct
and the FTC: Advancing Human Rights Through Deceptive Advertising, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 603, 604 (2000) (commenting that as transnational corporations gain more
power and influence, national governments lose power); Erin Elizabeth Macek,
Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Enterprises Responsibility: Corporate Codes
of Conduct in the 21-t Century, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 101, 103 (2002) (noting that
transnational corporations exercise "greater power and influence within certain countries
than the respective national governments").
206 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 295 (noting states' inclination to "ease labor standards,
modify tax regulations, and relax other standards to attract foreign direct investment");
see also Branson, supra note 195, at 133 (observing that multinationals may seek to set
up operations in countries with cheaper labor costs and low or no minimum wage
requirements); Benjamin N. David, Note & Comment, The Effects of Worker's Rights
Protection in United States Trade Laws: A Case Study of El Salvador, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L &
POL'Y 1167, 1176 (1995) (discussing "low-wage" internationalism).
207 See Ellinikos, supra note 20, at 26 (discussing the reasons why host governments
will not enforce international labor laws against MNCs for fear of losing much their
investments); see also Ratner, supra note 55, at 460 (discussing how the desire for foreign
direct investment has led developing countries to adjust domestic laws); Ayoub, supra
note 20, at 422 (noting that due to economic constraints, developing countries will not
enforce international or domestic labor laws on MNCs).
208 See Collingsworth, supra note 21, at 184 (stating that host states governments are
"corrupt, unreliable, or non-functioning"); Deva, supra note 13, at 1-2 (observing that
there is a problem when a MNC is more interested in foreign investment than in human
rights); Bridgeford, supra note 149, at 1017-18 (noting that ATCA suits could impede
foreign investment by multinational corporations).
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of choosing where to invest.20 9 They can forewarn developing
countries that foreign direct investment will either be withdrawn
or never take place unless human rights norms are respected.
MNCs have the option of simply pulling out states that commit
human rights violations. 210
B. Lack of Effective Governance of MNC Conduct Abroad
1. The Ineffectiveness of Codes of Conduct
Codes of conduct arose as attempts to comply with
international law norms.211 Voluntary codes of conduct passed by
international organizations became popular in the mid-1970s.21
2
The United Nations attempted an international code of conduct
with the U.N. Code of Code for Transnational Corporations in the
1980s.213 However, the Code was not adopted because of problems
faced in developing procedures governing enforceability and
209 See Diane F. Orentlicher & Timothy A. Gelatt, Public Law, Private Actors: The
Impact of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 66, 101
(stating that "transnational business practice can, and often does, have a direct and
substantial impact on human rights conditions in a host country"). But see FREEMAN,
supra note 53, at 157 (stating that MNCs are not in the business of human rights). See
generally Engle, supra note 13, at 107 (noting MNCs worldwide economic influence).
210 See Cassel, supra note 10, at 1973-74 (discussing several corporations' leaving
Burma because of child labor violations); see also Stephens, supra note 1, at (noting "that
transnationals have an ongoing, and at times devastating, impact on human rights
around the world"). See generally Orentlicher & Gelatt, supra note 209, at 125 (discussing
Levi Strauss' "Business Partner Terms of Engagement" by which the company imposes
minimum standards of conduct for the areas to which they send investment funds).
211 See Cassel, supra note 10, at 1969-70 (discussing early attempts at codification only
dealt with very basic rights); see also Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 967, 967 (1976) (setting
forth terms for a mid-70's attempt at setting a code). See generally Jane C. Hong,
Enforcement of Corporate Codes of Conduct: Finding a Private Right of Action for
International Laborers Against MNCs for Labor Rights Violations, 19 WIS. INT'L L.J. 41,
52-56 (2000) (discussing corporate codes of conduct in foreign direct investment).
212 See Cassel, supra note 10, at 1969-1971 (noting the attempts of passing corporate
codes of conduct by international organizations in the early 1970s); see also Jorge F.
Perez-Lopez, supra note 34 (discussing various codes of conduct which were proposed in
the 1970s); Breed, supra note 190, at 1024 (discussing voluntary codes of conduct
proposed in the 1970's and 1980's).
213 See Ayoub, supra note 20, at 420 (noting the codes' lack of teeth in the event that
member states fail to comply); see also Klaus A. Sahlgren, Emerging Standards of
International Trade and Investment: Multinational Codes and Corporate Conduct, 80 AM.
J. INT'L L. 253, 257 (1986) (noting the slow negotiations process which took place during
the formulation of the UN code). See generally Astid Boos-Hersberger, Transboundary
Water Pollution and State Responsibility: The Sandoz Spill, 4 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP.
L. 103, 129 (1997) (discussing the Code and its attempted regulation of MNCs in an
environmental pollution context).
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monitoring compliance. 214 A legally-binding international code
applicable to MNCs does not yet exist. Arguably one will
probably never come to fruition because of the difficultly in
writing a code that a majority of MNCs would agree to sign.
Corporate codes recently became popular with MNCs as a
response to criticism from the public and from non-governmental
organizations for their practices abroad, 215 but have not proven
effective in regulating human rights violations. 216 Corporate
codes do not carry the threat of sanctions 217 nor are they steadily
enforced. 218 Typically, these codes do not require an independent
monitoring body to oversee compliance. 219 Though numerous
214 See Ayoub, supra note 20, at 420-421 (discussing the failed United Nations Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations); see also Boos-Hersberger, supra note 213, at 130
(noting the lack of "enforcement mechanisms" which made the U.N. Code ineffective);
David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Current Development: Norms On The Responsibilities
Of Transnational Corporations And Other Business Enterprises With Regard To Human
Rights, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 901, 907 (2003) (discussing the need for further development of
enforcement mechanisms in such codes, in a human rights context).
215 See Barbara Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
153, 177-80 (1997) (listing examples of corporations that have set out standards for their
contracting partners regarding labor conditions and worker rights); see also Laura Ho &
Catherine Powell & Leti Volpp, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383, 401-03 (1996) (noting
manufacturers such as Wal-Mart and Lev's have implemented corporate codes of
conduct). See generally Ayoub, supra note 20, at 402-04 (discussing the advent of
corporate codes of conduct as a result of public criticism).
216 See Wood & Scharffs, supra note 79, at 557-58 (noting commentators have argued
corporate codes are "flawed in terms of content; they are flawed in terms of
implementation; and they are flawed in terms of enforcement"); see also Macek, supra
note 205, at 113 (stating that corporations who do not adopt codes from goodwill or
because of worrying about image do not have the reasons to adopt or abide by codes). See
generally Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 214, at 907 (discussing development of
government-set industry "Norms" as an alternative to individual MNC codes to protect
human rights).
217 See Ayoub, supra note 20, at 403-04 (arguing codes of conduct do not have the effect
of obliging subsidiaries and subcontractors of MNCs to abide by requirements); see also
Saunders, supra note 176, at 1460 (noting that corporate codes of conduct are generally
unenforceable as a result of their voluntary nature). But see Ayoub, supra note 20, at 420
(showing that a government-created UN code has similar enforcement problems).
218 See, e.g., Bob Ortega, Conduct Codes Garner Goodwill for Retailers, But Violations
Go On, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1995, at Al (discussing codes implemented by J.C. Penney,
Wal-Mart, and Levi Strauss in the apparel industry that have not stopped labor violations
from occurring in Central America because contracting foreign companies do not monitor
for violations as required). See generally Sacharoff, supra note 190, at 936-37 (discussing
self-regulation by MNC's and its necessarily arbitrary, ultimately ineffective nature);
Saunders, supra note 176, at 1437 (noting that the codes of conduct are "generally
voluntary and rarely enforced").
219 See e.g., Nike Code of Conduct, at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml
page=25&cat=compliance&subcat=code (last updated Jan. 2004) (setting for the
company's compliance monitoring and assessment code, but failing to mention that an
independent monitoring board is required under its code) (last visited Apr. 26, 2004); see
also Sacharoff, supra note 190, at 936-37 (noting that the corporate codes of conduct are
generally subject to approval only of the host nation, as such their structure is generally
arbitrary). See generally Borg, supra note 177, at 643 (recognizing the flaws of current
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corporate codes exist involving compliance with human rights,
because they are voluntary, many America MNCs have yet to
implement such codes. 220 Furthermore, MNCs do not find
corporate codes appealing for fear other MNCs may not have
enacted them. 221 A corporate code would place them at an
economic disadvantage by possibly leading to a loss in profits
from lost contracts with developing states. 22 Because the best
and primary interests of corporations are shareholder profits,
such decisions may logically result in avoiding implementation of
corporate codes of conduct if an end result would be loss to
shareholders and the corporation.
2. The Lack of International Governance Over MNC Conduct
International organizations governing MNCs conduct within
human rights law do not exist. 223 For example, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) views its function in international law to
be governed by economic issues only and not human rights.224
voluntary MNC corporate codes, and arguing for new law providing for monitoring and
enforcement).
220 See Cassel, supra note 10, at 1974 (noting that less than ten percent of U.S. based
MNCs have adopted corporate codes); N. Morris, Saving the Brand Name, MACLEAN'S,
Dec. 11, 1995, at 30 (discussing the surprisingly low number of American MNCs that have
adopted voluntary Codes of Conduct). See generally International Labor Rights Fund,
North American Free Trade Agreement and Labor Rights, 1995 (advocating adoption of a
universal code of conduct), available at http://www.laborrights.org/publications/nafta.html
(last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
221 See generally Michael A. Sontoro, Defending Labor Rights: On the Barricades and In
The Boardroom, at 307 (noting that increased labor costs would have to be passed to
consumers, forcing the company to choose between ethics and profits), available at
http://www.watsoninstitute.org fbjwa/archive/9.2/Essays/Santoro.pdf (last visited Apr. 26,
2004); Toftoy, supra note 189, at 906 (discussing pressures on MNCs that effectively
discourage developments in labor rights in foreign direct investment situations); Robert J.
Liubicic, Corporate Codes Of Conduct And Product Labeling Schemes: The Limits And
Possibilities Of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private Initiatives, LAW
AND POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, Sept. 1998, at 111 (discussing the negative
indirect effects of enacting Codes of Conduct).
222 See id. (proposing that American MNCs that adopt 'costly' labor standards may find
themselves at a disadvantage in competition against non-US MNCs that do not adopt
such standards); see also Liza Featherstone & Doug Henwood, Economists vs. Students,
THE NATION, Feb. 2001, at 6 (arguing that the lost profits are generally easily recovered
by these businesses, and that consumers generally do not mind increased price in
exchange for labor rights for workers). See generally Redmond, supra note 81 (discussing
the conflict between concerns of "profit maximization and those of human rights").
223 See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Social Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1207, 1211 (2002) (noting how WTO may have to play increasing role in regulating
MNCs); Weissbrodt and Kruger, supra note 214, at 907 (advocating for the development of
mandatory human rights labor codes), See Cassel, supra note 10, at 1969-1974 (discussing
various "attempts" at putting international standards into place).
224 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 291 (discussing how IMF guidelines only deal with
economic issues and do not mention human rights); see also William H. Meyer & Boyka
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Similarly, the International Labor Organization (ILO), an agency
of the United Nations, can only bind state members which ratify
their conventions. 225 The ILO therefore cannot be viewed as
influential in guiding MNC conduct because of its lack of
enforcement power on MNCs. 226 MNCs are not bound to any such
guidelines. The lack of international sanctions permits MNCs to
continue investing in developing countries without fear of
apprehension by'international organizations. 227 Unless MNCs are
taking criminal action, they will not be accountable under
international human rights law.228
Stefanova, Human Rights, the UN Global Compact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 501, 505 (2001) (noting that the IMF is obligated to "respect", but not promote or
fulfill human rights). See generally Rajesh Swaminathan, Regulating Development:
Structural Adjustment and The Case for National Enforcement of Economic and Social
Rights, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 267, 300 (1999) (discussing the IMF's involvement with
economic regulation, but leaving labor rights to the local courts).
225 See generally Michael J. Dennis, CURRENT DEVELOPMENT: Newly Adopted
Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 789, 794 (2000)
(noting that countries which are not party to the ILO's conventions are not bound to it);
Charles J. Morris, A Blueprint For Reform Of The National, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 517,
524-5 (1994) (discussing the ILO's labor rights policies to which member nations are
bound); Rupneet Sidhu, Child Laborers: The World's Potential Future Labor Resource
Exploited and Depleted, 15 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 111, 115 (2004) (noting that the ILO
became "the first specialized agency of the United Nations").
226 See Collingsworth, supra note 21, at 184 (explaining ILO's lack of enforcement
power); see also Report of the Commission of Inquiry: Forced Labour in Myanmar
(Burma), ILO (July 2, 1998) (reporting on labor rights violations in Burma as a basis for
persuasion of unbound MNCs to take action) (on file with ILRF), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm. See
generally Lisa G. Baltazar, Government Sanctions And Private Initiatives: Striking A New
Balance For U.S. Enforcement Of Internationally-Recognized Workers' Rights, 29 COLUM.
HuMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 687, 702 (1998) (discussing the frustration with ILO enforcement
measures as "understandable").
227 See Baker, supra note 21, at 141 (noting lack of sanctions); Terry Morehead Dworkin,
Whistleblowing, MNCs, and Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 460 (2002) (noting lack
of control over MNCs allows them to act as "independent states"); see also Mary Gray
Davidson, The Social Construction of Disability: Historical, Contemporary, and
Comparative Views: The International Labour Organization's Latest Campaign to End
Child Labor: Will it Succeed Where Others Have Failed?, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203, 222 (2001) (noting lack of sanctions as a cause for continued child labor
practices in soccer ball industry).
228 See Sacharoff, supra note 190, at 938 (discussing the "obstacles" preventing the
holding of MNCs liable under international law, noting that many MNCs are often "above
the law"). But see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004) (providing for a cause of action for deprivation
of civil rights against a private actor who acts "under color of law", applicable in this
sense to MNCs which can be considered de-facto state actors); Alien Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (providing civil remedies against MNCs in these situations); Sacharoff,
supra note 190, at 954-55 (discussing the possibility of holding MNCs liable as de-facto
state actors in § 1983 actions).
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C. The Ethical Duties of MNCs as Global Citizens
MNCs, as global citizens, are members of international society.
Their interactions with states and individuals have
ramifications. 229 As global citizens, and from these interactions,
MNCs owe ethical duties particularly in the area of human
rights.230 Proponents of foreign direct investment argue that
MNCs bring economic wealth and further human rights through
economic stability.23 1 Indeed, MNCs are substantially responsible
for increasing revenue in developing markets, but at times it has
been at the expense of the rights of citizens. By increasing gross
domestic products of developing countries, MNCs do not abrogate
their duty to abide by international law norms.23 2 It is illogical to
argue the simple creation of an economic right negates respecting
an individual's human rights.
Some commentators argue MNCs have one duty: to make a
profit.23 3 In turn, MNCs will adapt to "socially responsible
229 See generally Betz, supra note 137, at 188-89 (discussing how human rights
organizations are using federal courts to compel MNCs to either control the behavior of
their military security forces or cease entering into such ventures all together); Stephens,
supra note 1, at 46 (noting harsh ramifications of IBM's involvement with Nazi party);
Breed, supra note 190, at 1008 (pointing out that the economic power and geographic
scope enjoyed by American MNCs provides them with frequent opportunities to interfere
with the enjoyment of a broad range of human rights).
230 See de Lisle, supra note 198, at 492 (noting multinational corporations, and not just
governments or individual international criminals, have human rights duties); see also
Sydney M. Cone, III, The Multinational Enterprise as Global Corporate Citizen, 21 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 3 (2001) (stating expressly that multinational enterprises are
part of civil society). See generally Anderson, supra note 13, at 466 (discussing the
adoption and subsequent impact of corporate ethical policies).
231 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 291-92 (explaining argument which justifies MNC
investment as bringing forth economic stability and greater wealth to developing
countries); see also Michael D. Pendleton, A New Human Right - The Right to
Globalization, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2052, 2052 (1999) (proposing positive contributions
of globalization argue for its acceptance as a new human right). See generally Patricia
Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human
Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POLY 1, 42-45 (1996) (discussing how economic power can be utilized to sanction human
rights violators more effectively).
232 See generally Tara Bunker, Environmental Upgrade: The Potential for Chile to Use
Market Incentives in Preparing for NAFTA Accession, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY
165, 192-93 (1997) (acknowledging that the presence of MNCs in Chile and the large
amount of foreign capital invested there tend to favor a market incentive system, helping
Chile to generate more revenue); deLisle, supra note 198, at 492 (discussing MNCs and
their operation under international law); Dennis, supra note 225, at 380-81 (discussing
whether there is a "right to development" and the UN's role in targeting official
development assistance).
233 See Stephens, supra note 1 (noting Milton Friedman's essay which referred to
business's social responsibility as increasing its profits); see also Redmond, supra note 81
(stating the economic objective of the business corporation is the maximization of
corporate profit and shareholder gain). See generally P.W. Singer, Peacekeepers, Inc.,
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behavior" as a response to criticism that may hurt their end
profit. 234 Nevertheless, it is doubtful MNCs would argue they are
not bound to respect the same human rights norms, which govern
states and individuals. MNCs are aware of the effects they have
on human rights.235 If they were not aware, voluntary corporate
codes would never have arisen because consumers would not
have known human rights violations were committed. Why
MNCs adapt their behaviors is irrelevant because they are aware
of their duties within international society and must adapt in
order to comply with these duties. If they did not have duties
under international law, then such backlash to their behaviors
abroad would never have arisen. 236
POL'y REV., Jun. 1, 2003, at 59 (examining proposals for privatized peacemaking and
recognizing that security goals of clients are often in tension with private firms' aim of
profit maximization, resulting in considerations of the good of the private company that
are not always identical with the public good).
234 See Stephens, supra note 1 (discussing William Safire's argument of corporate
motivations behind "socially responsible behavior" are based on responses to potential
profit gains or losses); see also Joel L. Hodes & Ellen M. Bach, Corporate America's
Response to the AIDS Crisis: What Price Glory?, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1091, 1110-12 (theorizing
that if profit is a critical motivator of American businesses, then a goal of policymakers
should be to demonstrate to those businesses how HIV/AIDS will affect their profit
margins). See generally Abagail McWilliams & Donald Siegel, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Financial Performance: Correlation or Misspecification?, 21 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 603, 603-07 (May 2000) (examining the issues concerning the relationship
between corporate social responsibility and economic performance).
235 See Breed, supra note 190, at 1009-12 (discussing the broad scope of corporate
human rights violations). See generally Cassel, supra note 10, at 1970-71 (noting the
concept of self-imposed corporate responsibility in the form of a code of conduct was first
popularized in the 1970s and 1980s as a response to the movement to end apartheid in
South Africa through divestiture) (emphasis added); Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and
Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations in the Protection of International
Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 153, 157-59 (1997) (noting corporate awareness
stemming from recent consumer pressure on U.S. companies to ensure that they do not
market the products of forced, convict, or child labor demonstrate the increasing
sensitivity of companies and the public to significant human rights problems present in
many of the countries in which TNCs operate).
236 See Glen Kelley, Note, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to
Multinational Corporations, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 483, 485 (2001) (examining the
human rights implications of the activities of large MNCs, arguing that related concerns
must be addressed effectively to avoid a growing societal backlash against foreign
investment in both developed and developing states); see also L. Kim Tan, Critics Slam
China Status, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 29, 1999, at 28 (discussing the WTO protests in
Seattle and the argument that the WTO should be stopped because it has consistently
ruled in favor of multi-national corporations and against environmental, health, safety
and labor laws). See generally Larry Rohter, Hondurans in 'Sweatshops' See Opportunity,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1996, at Al (noting that while under Honduran law children may
begin working at 14, most garment factories dismissed all workers under 16 due to a fear
of U.S. consumer backlashes).
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VI. CONCLUSION
International law by nature must continually evolve as a
response to interactions between both state and non-state actors.
Since World War II, the international legal structure has
expanded to include states, international organizations, non-
governmental organizations, individuals, and MNCs. 23 7 All of
these actors are now subject to international law. International
law norms are externalized and internalized by interactions
between all actors in the international system. Human rights
norms have been externalized since the enactment of the UDHR
and later state practices respecting such rights. 238 The United
States has recently taken part in furthering such norms by
internalizing them through application of the ATCA.239 Holding
MNCs accountable under the ATCA will aid in furthering the
goals of international law, particularly human rights norms. 240
237 See Reed, supra note 1, at 222 (recognizing states have certain duties with respect to
its citizens under international law); see also Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1830 (2002) (arguing that absent an
incentive toward compliance, resources devoted to the creation and maintenance of
international legal structures are wasted); Raj Aggarwal, The Finance and Taxation
Decisions of Multinationals, J. INT'L. Bus. STUD., Mar. 22, 1990, at 170 (noting the myriad
number of regulations, legal constraints, and public policies such as direct or derivative
capital controls set up by capital-exporting or capital-importing countries, price controls
and other legal constraints, in support of the theory of an expansive international legal
structure).
238 See Ben Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights: Human Duties, Obligations and
Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 565, 575-76 (2001) (pointing to
numerous attempts to codify human responsibilities in a single document that followed
the enactment of UDHR). See generally Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Framework of
International Human Rights: A Source of Social Justice in the U.S., 3 N.Y. CITY L. REV.
59, 63 (1998/1999) (stating that representing norms and claims of universal and
fundamental dimension, international human rights acquire impact through popular
organizing and demand); Book Note, The Future of International Human Rights:
Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights, 1
CHI. J. INT'L L. 489, 490 (noting the argument that the UDHR's existence within, and
administration by, a framework of nation-states undermines the proper universal
character of human rights).
239 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that an act of
torture committed by a state official against one held in detention violates established
norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations); see also
Koh, supra note 4, at 2366 (noting huge impact Filartiga had on international rights). See
generally Beth Stephens, Problems of Proving International Human Rights Law in the
U.S. Courts:Litigating Customary International Human Rights Norms, 25 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 191, 192 (1995/1996) (noting the Filartiga court's holding that torture by a state
official against one held in detention "violates established norms of the international law
of human rights" and thus constitutes a tort "in violation of the law of nations," actionable
under the Alien Tort Claims Act).
240 See generally Betz, supra note 137, at 164, 169-85 (examining the history of ATCA
litigation and how MNCs have become targets of the statute); Collingsworth, supra note
21, at 196 (noting potential of "advancing human rights law by using the ATCA
aggressively"); Breed, supra note 212, at 1006 (acknowledging many human rights
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The United States is internalizing a norm that came into
existence over forty years ago. It is the United States' duty to
respect the human rights of citizens. When egregious human
violations occur against citizens, and if the United States has
federal jurisdiction against the violators of such rights, then
application of the ATCA is justified.
MNCs are some of the most powerful actors within
international society.24' This is primarily a result of
globalization. Globalization has enabled MNCs to transgress
international borders and profit from their relations with
developing countries. 242 Unfortunately, human rights abuses
occurred at the hands of the military regimes of such countries,
and MNCs did not take action to stop such violations from taking
place for fear of losing profits. 243 However, the aftermath of
World War II established individual liability for violations of
international law.244 Consequently, under this norm, MNCs can
advocates believe the current trend of litigation under the ATCA is the proper method of
controlling American MNCs).
241 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 273 (discussing rising power of non-state actors and
decrease in power of governments); see also Duke, supra note 172, at 362 (noting the
future of human rights protections seems to include a shift in the focus of human rights
responsibility from state actors to the increasingly more powerful corporate actors);
Breed, supra note 212, at 1008 (stating MNCs power and control over resources in
developing countries combine to turn MNCs into powerful ambassadors for the United
States, who frequently interact with both the governments and the populations of
developing countries).
242 See Teitel, supra note 6, at 357-58 (discussing globalization and international law);
see also Ayoub, supra note 20, at 397 (pointing out that as a result of increased economic
globalization during the last quarter century, many MNCs locate their manufacturing
plants in economically developing regions, searching for cheap labor and low regulatory
costs in order to produce their products at the lowest cost available, thereby maximizing
their sale profits). See generally Duke, supra note 172, at 340 (opining that Developing
countries entice MNCs with low wages and an increasingly more skilled and productive
workforce).
243 See Stephens, supra note 1, at 46 (noting IBM's involvement with Nazi party was
based on profits and didn't require human rights violations to be a factor in decision
making process); see also Kelley, supra note 236, at 508 (hypothesizing that MNC trading
practices have put money into the hands of brutal and undemocratic military regimes,
and even provide funds that rebel forces use on weapons, prolonging bloody civil wars).
See generally, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, A Close Shave in Burma: Unocal Corporation and
Private Enterprise Liability for International Human Rights Violations, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 1, 57-59, 66-68 (1998) (describing the dependence of Myanmar's military
leadership on direct foreign investment to fund their illegitimate and highly repressive
regime).
244 See Koh, supra note 4, at 2359 (noting expansion of international law to various
actors); see also Thames, supra note 33, at 153 (examining whether a court can find
private individual liability via the ATCA for a claim of forced labor). See generally Tina
Garmon, Comment, Domesticating International Corporate Responsibility: Holding
Private Military Firms Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 11 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 325, 340-44 (discussing the development of the notion of individual liability
under international law).
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be held accountable for doing absolutely nothing to stop such
atrocities from taking place.245
MNCS have the power to effect change because of their
dominant role within international society and in the domestic
relations of developing countries. 246 If MNCs only view relations
in terms of profit, they should be hesitant to allow violations to
go unaddressed for fear of having to pay out large sums of money
under the ATCA. It would be much simpler for MNCs to ensure
such violations no longer take place by taking matters into their
own hands. MNCs may therefore require compliance with
corporate codes of conduct and require outside inspectors to
ensure compliance. 247
By finding MNCs accountable under the ATCA, MNCs will be
forced to react to the possible legal implications for their conduct
abroad. Application of ATCA is just one step in ensuring respect
for human rights. It is a further step in enforcing international
law, a law that applies to all peoples, states, and non-state
actors.
245 See generally Deva, supra note 13, at 45 (advocating the requirement of mens rea be
satisfied both by act or omission; 'either intention or knowledge to violate human rights,
or the failure to take reasonable steps to avoid such a violation, should be sufficient to
impose criminal liability on MNCs"); Ramasastry, supra note 15, at 104-05 (asserting
Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations' (NGOs) argument that when MNCs
become aware of systematic or continuous human rights abuses, they have an affirmative
obligation to raise these issues with the government and to attempt to exert influence);
Pia Zara Thadhani, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Abuses: Is Unocal The Answer?,
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 632 (2000) (criticizing courts that stretch acceptable bounds
by fitting corporate inaction under "color of authority," especially in Unocal, where the
corporations were only passively involved in human rights violations).
246 See Shelton, supra note 9, at 273 (noting rising power of non-state actors); see also
Breed, supra note 190, at 1008 (describing MNCs as powerful ambassadors for the United
States, who frequently interact with both the governments and the populations of
developing countries). See generally Duke, supra note 172 (examining the shift in the
focus of human rights responsibility from state actors to the increasingly more powerful
corporate actors).
247 See Michael S. Baram, Multinational Corporations, Private Codes, and Technology
Transfer for Sustainable Development, 24 ENVTL. L. 33, 43 (1994) (examining various
codes of corporate conduct and their efficacy). See generally Cassel, supra note 10, at 1964
(noting development of corporate codes of conduct in the 1970's); Breed, supra note 190, at
1024 (acknowledging the concept of self-imposed corporate responsibility in the form of a
code of conduct was first popularized in the 1970s and 1980s as a response to the
movement to end apartheid in South Africa through divestiture).

